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Pete Hegseth Is a Wrecking Ball
By David French - Sep 6, 2026
NY Times
Link to Internet (if no paywall or limited free access): https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/06/opinion/hegseth-national-security-military-generals.html
Summary
The Trump administration’s actions are severely damaging American national security. The frequent scandals distract from the administration’s harmful policies, including replacing meritocracy with sycophancy, depleting munitions, and straining alliances. These actions are creating vulnerabilities in the military and eroding trust with allies, potentially leading to long-term consequences for the United States.
Key Points
- The rapid pace of administration scandals obscures a broader, systemic threat to American national security. Despite notable individual tactical successes by a historically resilient military, leadership decisions are substituting professional merit with political loyalty.
- In the short term, military engagements in the Middle East have severely depleted stocks of critical air-defense interceptors and precision weapons. Redirecting strategic assets like aircraft carriers to maintain a stalemate with Iran has left high-risk regions like the Indo-Pacific without active carrier strike group coverage, while weapon shortages directly exacerbate defensive vulnerabilities for allies in Ukraine.
- Beyond immediate resource strains, international alliances are suffering long-term structural damage. Unilateral military actions, trade disputes, and threats toward partner nations have fractured trust, leading allies to view the American electorate itself as volatile. Consequently, partner nations are growing reluctant to assist in U.S. operations or rely on defense guarantees, signaling a broader period of Western strategic exposure.
- Domestically, high-level purges and rapid political promotions are institutionalizing sycophancy over competence within the military command structure. Replacing civilian and military leadership with political loyalists threatens military readiness, risks turning armed forces into domestic political tools, and leaves major service branches without confirmed leadership during a critical period of global military evolution.
Article's Full Text:
It is difficult to fathom the damage President Trump is doing to America’s national security. He is making our nation more vulnerable than it has been at any time since the cloudiest days of the Cold War.
Trump administration scandals come with such speed and frequency that it’s easy to get lost in the weeds. One minute you’re reading about potential war crimes in the Caribbean. The next moment there’s a news alert about Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s ongoing purge of generals. Then you click over and read a story about depleted stocks of some of America’s most important munitions.
That’s a fraction of the havoc the administration has wrought. In a strange way, the very frequency of the scandals works to the administration’s advantage. Each new story distracts us from the last one, and we don’t have a minute to pause, take a deep breath and look at the whole picture.
Let’s take that deep breath now.
Before I do, I want to be careful not to be too alarmist. Our military is still highly capable, and we have watched it successfully execute some extraordinarily difficult missions during Trump’s second term. The capture of President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela and the rescue of two downed American airmen from the heart of Iran were remarkable feats of skill and courage.
There are also signs that the Navy has been slowly, painstakingly making progress toward reopening the Strait of Hormuz — traffic through the strait is well below prewar averages, but some ships are getting through.
Just as the Trump administration miscalculated when it launched its war on Iran, the Iranian regime may have miscalculated when it refused to cease hostilities after winning what would have been a decisive victory through the memorandum of understanding it negotiated with the United States.
It’s comforting — I guess — to know that Hegseth can’t undo the effects of a generations-long commitment to excellence in just 20 months.
That’s the end of the good news. From the top down, Trump is replacing the highly imperfect meritocracy of American public service with an idiocracy, and his corrupt idiocrats are creating profound short-, medium- and long-term harms to American national security.
The short-term damage is serious enough. Even just to achieve what is at best a stalemate in the Persian Gulf, the administration has created a critical shortage in interceptors that can shoot down missiles and drones and in other precision munitions, including some of our most advanced offensive weapons.
At the same time, to maintain the stalemate against Iran, the United States is drawing resources from other, more dangerous theaters of potential conflict. There are now no active carrier battle groups in the Pacific region, for example, exactly when China has ramped up its military activities around Taiwan.
The lack of interceptors is escalating the crisis in Ukraine. Russia is able to pound Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities with ballistic missiles virtually at will, creating a critical vulnerability for the Ukrainian war effort. Last week, for example, Kyiv endured the longest sustained bombing campaign on the Ukrainian capital since the opening days of the war.
The Economist has also reported that Putin is planning to throw hundreds of thousands of additional troops into the fight, and he’s provoking NATO with a series of incursions so severe (including, according to the German government, an attempted drone attack at Leipzig/Halle Airport in Germany) that it prompted John Ratcliffe, the C.I.A. director, to visit Russia to reportedly warn Putin against any further aggression.
As long as Iran — a longstanding ally of Russia that’s closely linked to its neighbor through the Caspian Sea — remains in the fight, it can continue to deplete our interceptors to the point where it might take years to bring our stocks back to acceptable levels, even if we ramp up production at immense cost.
All of this is taking place against the backdrop of terrible self-imposed wounds to America’s alliances. There are obvious immediate risks, for example, to withdrawing troops from allied nations or shortening military exercises with South Korea, but the damage done by engaging in trade wars with allies and threatening aggression against Greenland (remember that?) can’t be repaired by just one administration.
Our allies learned an important lesson from Trump’s second election. It’s not just that Trump is mercurial and unreliable, it’s that the American electorate is mercurial and unreliable. More than 77 million Americans compared Trump’s first term with Joe Biden’s only term and said, “More Trump, please.”
Even if the next Democratic president tries to reconcile with our allies, every allied government will be asking itself, “How long will this last?” Every prudent allied government will hedge its geopolitical bets, and that can harm the United States in incalculable ways.
Our allies fear not just that they’ve lost Trump, but even worse, they fear that they’ve lost a substantial portion of the American people.
We’ve already seen the consequences of American faithlessness. The Trump administration has pitched a fit demanding allied aid in reopening the Strait of Hormuz, only to be greeted with stony silence. Why should our allies expend blood and treasure standing with an American government that didn’t even have the decency to consult them before launching its costly, poorly planned Middle Eastern adventure?
Why should they expend blood and treasure standing with America when America is also threatening the independence and sovereignty of NATO member states? They are getting enough of that from Putin.
The end result could well be a period of extended Western vulnerability as Europe bears the considerable costs (and takes several years to increase its defense capabilities) to deter Russia even while it can’t count on the United States to fulfill its treaty obligations.
The long-term threat is to the character and competence of the armed forces. They are becoming politicized, and the politicization of a military can both destroy its combat effectiveness and turn it into an instrument of domestic oppression.
If you are under the delusion that Hegseth’s purges are about competence more than loyalty — a welcome corrective to the excesses of D.E.I. programs — well then, as we say in the South, bless your heart.
The sycophancy that pervades Trump’s second term is creating perverse incentives. I was struck by a recent piece in The Dispatch (where I used to write and still contribute to podcasts) by Mike Nelson, a former special forces officer who is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project.
Nelson focused on Chris LaNeve, a lieutenant general and the commander of the 8th Army in Korea. LaNeve video-conferenced in to Trump’s inaugural ball to praise Trump, and Trump praised him right back. “Is this man central casting or what?,” Trump said, “If I’m doing a movie, I’d pick him to play my lead.”
Trump did exactly that. “In February 2025,” as Nelson writes, “Hegseth fired Air Force Lt. Gen. Jennifer Short as his senior military adviser and named LaNeve as her replacement.” Months later, Hegseth fired Gen. James Mingus, the Army’s vice chief of staff. And who did the White House name to replace him? You guessed it — General LaNeve.
That’s not the end of LaNeve’s meteoric rise. Again, here’s Nelson, “Six months after that, Hegseth fired the occupant of the Army’s top job, Gen. Randy George,” who was serving as chief of staff, “and — to quote Gomer Pyle — surprise, surprise, surprise, LaNeve has been serving as the acting chief of staff since and is Hegseth’s pick to permanently fill the job, although he seems to face some pushback from G.O.P. senators.”
Maybe General LaNeve is genuinely gifted enough to merit those promotions — I can’t say — but the chain of events has set a terrible example for future commanders.
Trump’s critics aren’t the only ones alarmed, I’d refer you to the recent resignation of Army Secretary Dan Driscoll. As Nancy A. Youssef, Missy Ryan and Michael Scherer reported for The Atlantic, in a recent White House meeting, “Army Secretary Dan Driscoll brought his concerns about the future of the Army under Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth directly to President Trump.”
Driscoll was reportedly worried that Hegseth’s purges were hampering the ability of the Army to transform itself. And this is just as the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East are demonstrating that the world is in the midst of another revolution in military affairs, and we are not prepared.
“Hegseth’s purge of the military has been so dramatic,” they wrote, “that with Driscoll gone, the military’s largest service is left without a top civilian leader, a Senate-confirmed top general, a confirmed Army general in charge of operations, or a confirmed commander of Army troops in Europe.”
If you pay close attention to the news, you know that my list of negative developments is woefully incomplete (for example, granting the Pentagon an ownership stake in a Venezuelan oil venture is more reminiscent of the way that the Chinese or Iranian militaries work than the way the United States military is supposed to), but it should suffice to paint a clear picture.
The combination of corruption, stupidity and sycophancy — the Pentagon was recently caught surreptitiously employing conservative media influencers who reliably defend Hegseth online — that pervades the Trump administration is now infecting the Pentagon at the moment that our most powerful enemies are becoming more aggressive.
I loved my time serving my country. It was one of the great honors of my life. If anything, I’m biased toward viewing the military in general and the Army in particular through rose-colored glasses. But my view is getting darker. Terrible leadership of even the most virtuous institutions can have terrible consequences.
If history teaches us anything, it’s that the battlefield is the most unforgiving place on earth.
Trump administration scandals come with such speed and frequency that it’s easy to get lost in the weeds. One minute you’re reading about potential war crimes in the Caribbean. The next moment there’s a news alert about Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s ongoing purge of generals. Then you click over and read a story about depleted stocks of some of America’s most important munitions.
That’s a fraction of the havoc the administration has wrought. In a strange way, the very frequency of the scandals works to the administration’s advantage. Each new story distracts us from the last one, and we don’t have a minute to pause, take a deep breath and look at the whole picture.
Let’s take that deep breath now.
Before I do, I want to be careful not to be too alarmist. Our military is still highly capable, and we have watched it successfully execute some extraordinarily difficult missions during Trump’s second term. The capture of President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela and the rescue of two downed American airmen from the heart of Iran were remarkable feats of skill and courage.
There are also signs that the Navy has been slowly, painstakingly making progress toward reopening the Strait of Hormuz — traffic through the strait is well below prewar averages, but some ships are getting through.
Just as the Trump administration miscalculated when it launched its war on Iran, the Iranian regime may have miscalculated when it refused to cease hostilities after winning what would have been a decisive victory through the memorandum of understanding it negotiated with the United States.
It’s comforting — I guess — to know that Hegseth can’t undo the effects of a generations-long commitment to excellence in just 20 months.
That’s the end of the good news. From the top down, Trump is replacing the highly imperfect meritocracy of American public service with an idiocracy, and his corrupt idiocrats are creating profound short-, medium- and long-term harms to American national security.
The short-term damage is serious enough. Even just to achieve what is at best a stalemate in the Persian Gulf, the administration has created a critical shortage in interceptors that can shoot down missiles and drones and in other precision munitions, including some of our most advanced offensive weapons.
At the same time, to maintain the stalemate against Iran, the United States is drawing resources from other, more dangerous theaters of potential conflict. There are now no active carrier battle groups in the Pacific region, for example, exactly when China has ramped up its military activities around Taiwan.
The lack of interceptors is escalating the crisis in Ukraine. Russia is able to pound Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities with ballistic missiles virtually at will, creating a critical vulnerability for the Ukrainian war effort. Last week, for example, Kyiv endured the longest sustained bombing campaign on the Ukrainian capital since the opening days of the war.
The Economist has also reported that Putin is planning to throw hundreds of thousands of additional troops into the fight, and he’s provoking NATO with a series of incursions so severe (including, according to the German government, an attempted drone attack at Leipzig/Halle Airport in Germany) that it prompted John Ratcliffe, the C.I.A. director, to visit Russia to reportedly warn Putin against any further aggression.
As long as Iran — a longstanding ally of Russia that’s closely linked to its neighbor through the Caspian Sea — remains in the fight, it can continue to deplete our interceptors to the point where it might take years to bring our stocks back to acceptable levels, even if we ramp up production at immense cost.
All of this is taking place against the backdrop of terrible self-imposed wounds to America’s alliances. There are obvious immediate risks, for example, to withdrawing troops from allied nations or shortening military exercises with South Korea, but the damage done by engaging in trade wars with allies and threatening aggression against Greenland (remember that?) can’t be repaired by just one administration.
Our allies learned an important lesson from Trump’s second election. It’s not just that Trump is mercurial and unreliable, it’s that the American electorate is mercurial and unreliable. More than 77 million Americans compared Trump’s first term with Joe Biden’s only term and said, “More Trump, please.”
Even if the next Democratic president tries to reconcile with our allies, every allied government will be asking itself, “How long will this last?” Every prudent allied government will hedge its geopolitical bets, and that can harm the United States in incalculable ways.
Our allies fear not just that they’ve lost Trump, but even worse, they fear that they’ve lost a substantial portion of the American people.
We’ve already seen the consequences of American faithlessness. The Trump administration has pitched a fit demanding allied aid in reopening the Strait of Hormuz, only to be greeted with stony silence. Why should our allies expend blood and treasure standing with an American government that didn’t even have the decency to consult them before launching its costly, poorly planned Middle Eastern adventure?
Why should they expend blood and treasure standing with America when America is also threatening the independence and sovereignty of NATO member states? They are getting enough of that from Putin.
The end result could well be a period of extended Western vulnerability as Europe bears the considerable costs (and takes several years to increase its defense capabilities) to deter Russia even while it can’t count on the United States to fulfill its treaty obligations.
The long-term threat is to the character and competence of the armed forces. They are becoming politicized, and the politicization of a military can both destroy its combat effectiveness and turn it into an instrument of domestic oppression.
If you are under the delusion that Hegseth’s purges are about competence more than loyalty — a welcome corrective to the excesses of D.E.I. programs — well then, as we say in the South, bless your heart.
The sycophancy that pervades Trump’s second term is creating perverse incentives. I was struck by a recent piece in The Dispatch (where I used to write and still contribute to podcasts) by Mike Nelson, a former special forces officer who is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project.
Nelson focused on Chris LaNeve, a lieutenant general and the commander of the 8th Army in Korea. LaNeve video-conferenced in to Trump’s inaugural ball to praise Trump, and Trump praised him right back. “Is this man central casting or what?,” Trump said, “If I’m doing a movie, I’d pick him to play my lead.”
Trump did exactly that. “In February 2025,” as Nelson writes, “Hegseth fired Air Force Lt. Gen. Jennifer Short as his senior military adviser and named LaNeve as her replacement.” Months later, Hegseth fired Gen. James Mingus, the Army’s vice chief of staff. And who did the White House name to replace him? You guessed it — General LaNeve.
That’s not the end of LaNeve’s meteoric rise. Again, here’s Nelson, “Six months after that, Hegseth fired the occupant of the Army’s top job, Gen. Randy George,” who was serving as chief of staff, “and — to quote Gomer Pyle — surprise, surprise, surprise, LaNeve has been serving as the acting chief of staff since and is Hegseth’s pick to permanently fill the job, although he seems to face some pushback from G.O.P. senators.”
Maybe General LaNeve is genuinely gifted enough to merit those promotions — I can’t say — but the chain of events has set a terrible example for future commanders.
Trump’s critics aren’t the only ones alarmed, I’d refer you to the recent resignation of Army Secretary Dan Driscoll. As Nancy A. Youssef, Missy Ryan and Michael Scherer reported for The Atlantic, in a recent White House meeting, “Army Secretary Dan Driscoll brought his concerns about the future of the Army under Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth directly to President Trump.”
Driscoll was reportedly worried that Hegseth’s purges were hampering the ability of the Army to transform itself. And this is just as the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East are demonstrating that the world is in the midst of another revolution in military affairs, and we are not prepared.
“Hegseth’s purge of the military has been so dramatic,” they wrote, “that with Driscoll gone, the military’s largest service is left without a top civilian leader, a Senate-confirmed top general, a confirmed Army general in charge of operations, or a confirmed commander of Army troops in Europe.”
If you pay close attention to the news, you know that my list of negative developments is woefully incomplete (for example, granting the Pentagon an ownership stake in a Venezuelan oil venture is more reminiscent of the way that the Chinese or Iranian militaries work than the way the United States military is supposed to), but it should suffice to paint a clear picture.
The combination of corruption, stupidity and sycophancy — the Pentagon was recently caught surreptitiously employing conservative media influencers who reliably defend Hegseth online — that pervades the Trump administration is now infecting the Pentagon at the moment that our most powerful enemies are becoming more aggressive.
I loved my time serving my country. It was one of the great honors of my life. If anything, I’m biased toward viewing the military in general and the Army in particular through rose-colored glasses. But my view is getting darker. Terrible leadership of even the most virtuous institutions can have terrible consequences.
If history teaches us anything, it’s that the battlefield is the most unforgiving place on earth.
Trump Issues Serious Fed Warning As Bitcoin Braces For A Huge Price Shock
By Billy Bambrough - Sep 5, 2026
Forbes
Link to Internet (if no paywall or limited free access):
Summary
Bitcoin’s price surged to $82,000 due to traders’ expectations of a Federal Reserve interest rate cut. However, the price dropped after the U.S. added more jobs than expected, increasing the likelihood of a rate hike. President Trump criticized the Fed and urged them to lower interest rates, arguing that the U.S. should have the lowest rates globally.
Key Points
- Bitcoin surged past $82,000 driven by rate-cut expectations and U.S. dollar devaluation concerns, but it recently pulled back toward $78,000 as strong U.S. employment data increased the likelihood of a Federal Reserve interest rate hike in September.
- President Donald Trump renewed pressure on the Federal Reserve and Chair Kevin Warsh to lower interest rates, threatening to halt trade with deficit countries if cuts do not occur—a move economists warn could trigger severe inflation and economic contraction.
- Financial markets now reflect a roughly 60% probability of a September rate hike due to persistent high inflation and hawkish Fed signaling, leaving crypto prices under pressure pending the outcome of the upcoming Consumer Price Index release.
Article's Full Text:
Bitcoin has rocketed higher over the last month, soaring to $80,000 per bitcoin amid growing fears of a U.S. dollar "death spiral."
The bitcoin price topped $82,000 this week as traders cut their bets on a Federal Reserve interest rate hike late this month (combined with expectations of a Treasury bombshell).
Now, after the U.S. added far more than expected in August, rising chances that the Fed will hike rates have sent bitcoin lower—and led to U.S. President Donald Trump reigniting his war with the Fed.
“What I’m saying, very simply, is that we should be paying the lowest interest rate in the world,” Trump told reporters in the Oval Office, it was reported by CNBC.
Earlier, Trump posted to his Truth Social that he would stop trading with countries with which the U.S.had a deficit unless the Federal Reserve cut rates, something that would “crash the U.S. economy, as a shortage of goods would send prices and unemployment soaring,” according to economist and gold investor Peter Schiff.
"Lower the interest rates because the U.S.A. is a much stronger credit than it was just a short time ago," Trump wrote, adding in the Oval Office that the “big deficit with a lot of countries … should never have been allowed to happen. If we’re not going to be treated properly, we’re going to do that."
The market is currently pricing a near-60% chance of a Fed rate hike on September 16, up from a 50/50 split between a hold and hike earlier in the week.
Trump called on his newly appointed Federal Reserve chair Kevin Warsh to “get smart” and for the Fed board to “be patriots for a change."
Inflation has been above the Fed’s 2% target for almost six years, and last week Warsh said he needs confidence it is moving back to target “clearly and at sufficient speed. Otherwise, we have work to do,” a message widely taken by the market as opening the door open to a rate hike at the Fed’s September meeting.
“Today’s [jobs] print makes a September hike the base case instead of a risk, and we expect crypto to stay under pressure until the market has priced that fully,” Ryan Lee, chief analyst at Bitget Research, said in emailed comments.
"Bitcoin holding above $78,000 through next week would tell us the rate move is already discounted.”
The bitcoin and crypto market had cheered comments made by Fed governor Christopher Waller this week, who said he’d be “inclined to support” holding rates steady barring any surprises in upcoming inflation data.
Next week, the latest monthly consumer price index (CPI) report will be released, expected to show a 0.4% monthly rise in August CPI, and a 0.2% rise in the core measure, which excludes the volatile food and energy components, according to a Reuters poll.
Fed officials “have spent recent months underscoring their commitment to price stability, and at some point, that rhetoric will need to be backed by action if inflation fails to show sufficient progress,” Sid Vaidya, chief investment strategist at TD Wealth, told Reuters.
“CPI will certainly move the needle one way or the other ... so there is a lot riding on this report.”
The bitcoin price topped $82,000 this week as traders cut their bets on a Federal Reserve interest rate hike late this month (combined with expectations of a Treasury bombshell).
Now, after the U.S. added far more than expected in August, rising chances that the Fed will hike rates have sent bitcoin lower—and led to U.S. President Donald Trump reigniting his war with the Fed.
“What I’m saying, very simply, is that we should be paying the lowest interest rate in the world,” Trump told reporters in the Oval Office, it was reported by CNBC.
Earlier, Trump posted to his Truth Social that he would stop trading with countries with which the U.S.had a deficit unless the Federal Reserve cut rates, something that would “crash the U.S. economy, as a shortage of goods would send prices and unemployment soaring,” according to economist and gold investor Peter Schiff.
"Lower the interest rates because the U.S.A. is a much stronger credit than it was just a short time ago," Trump wrote, adding in the Oval Office that the “big deficit with a lot of countries … should never have been allowed to happen. If we’re not going to be treated properly, we’re going to do that."
The market is currently pricing a near-60% chance of a Fed rate hike on September 16, up from a 50/50 split between a hold and hike earlier in the week.
Trump called on his newly appointed Federal Reserve chair Kevin Warsh to “get smart” and for the Fed board to “be patriots for a change."
Inflation has been above the Fed’s 2% target for almost six years, and last week Warsh said he needs confidence it is moving back to target “clearly and at sufficient speed. Otherwise, we have work to do,” a message widely taken by the market as opening the door open to a rate hike at the Fed’s September meeting.
“Today’s [jobs] print makes a September hike the base case instead of a risk, and we expect crypto to stay under pressure until the market has priced that fully,” Ryan Lee, chief analyst at Bitget Research, said in emailed comments.
"Bitcoin holding above $78,000 through next week would tell us the rate move is already discounted.”
The bitcoin and crypto market had cheered comments made by Fed governor Christopher Waller this week, who said he’d be “inclined to support” holding rates steady barring any surprises in upcoming inflation data.
Next week, the latest monthly consumer price index (CPI) report will be released, expected to show a 0.4% monthly rise in August CPI, and a 0.2% rise in the core measure, which excludes the volatile food and energy components, according to a Reuters poll.
Fed officials “have spent recent months underscoring their commitment to price stability, and at some point, that rhetoric will need to be backed by action if inflation fails to show sufficient progress,” Sid Vaidya, chief investment strategist at TD Wealth, told Reuters.
“CPI will certainly move the needle one way or the other ... so there is a lot riding on this report.”
The Venezuelan billionaire the US investigated for money laundering now has a Pentagon oil deal.
By Sarah Kinosian, Marianna Parraga, and Gram Slattery - Sep 5, 2026
Reuters
pdf
Link to Internet if no paywall or limited free access):
Summary
Alejandro Betancourt, a Venezuelan billionaire, played a key role in the Trump administration’s oil deal with Venezuela. Despite being a target of U.S. money-laundering investigations, Betancourt provided information that helped enforce a U.S. naval blockade and facilitated negotiations between Washington and Caracas. His cooperation led to a significant oil agreement, granting the U.S. access to a portion of Venezuela’s crude reserves.
Key Points
- Strategic Energy Deal and Betancourt's Central Role
- Venezuelan billionaire Alejandro Betancourt has emerged as a primary broker in a long-term U.S.-Venezuela oil deal, granting the U.S. multi-decade access to roughly 20% of Venezuela's crude reserves. Through his company North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP), in which the Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Capital now holds a 35% stake, Betancourt serves as a key economic and diplomatic intermediary between Washington and Caracas following the January 3 removal of Nicolas Maduro.
- Assistance to U.S. Operations and Policy
- Prior to Maduro's capture, Betancourt provided actionable intelligence that aided the U.S. naval blockade against sanctioned oil tankers, leading to the interdiction of over a dozen vessels. He subsequently facilitated high-level negotiations with interim President Delcy Rodriguez, visited the Miraflores presidential palace alongside U.S. officials, and helped broker a major trading agreement responsible for exporting over 135 million barrels of crude.
- Halted Investigations and Legal Shielding
- Despite a history of international money-laundering probes—including an alleged $1 billion PDVSA embezzlement scheme in Florida—U.S. federal prosecutors recently paused their investigation into Betancourt, with supervisors reportedly discouraging further inquiry. Additionally, following U.S. pressure, Swiss authorities withdrew an extradition request for Betancourt from the UK, enabling him to travel freely between Florida and Venezuela without active U.S. charges.
- Controversial Background and Internal Pushback
- Betancourt first built his fortune as part of the "Bolichicos" generation through no-bid government power plant contracts that later faced scrutiny over operational failures. While U.S. officials defend the partnership based on NABEP's operational capacity and the age of the allegations, several former U.S. intelligence officials, diplomats, and prosecutors have expressed concern over Betancourt's significant influence on foreign policy given his past legal troubles and deep ties to former regime officials.
Article's Full Text:
The billionaire who helped broker the Trump administration’s sweeping long-term oil deal with Venezuela was until recently a target of U.S. money-laundering investigations involving funds embezzled from the state-owned oil company PDVSA. Now, after assisting U.S. authorities ahead of the capture of authoritarian leader Nicolas Maduro, Alejandro Betancourt is Washington’s key partner in an unusual oil agreement with Caracas.
According to last week’s announcement, the U.S. gains access to about one-fifth of Venezuela’s crude reserves for decades. The Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Capital takes a 35% stake in North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP), Betancourt’s company and a known crude producer in Venezuela. The State Department gets the right to buy 20% of NABEP’s oil at cost, and preferential access to the remaining 80% of output.
The deal marks a striking change of fortune for Betancourt, who four people familiar with U.S. policy in Venezuela said was key to U.S. strategy and planning in the lead-up to the January 3 operation that removed former President Maduro from power and flew him to New York to face charges of drug-trafficking, which Maduro denies.
Asked about the investigations of Betancourt, a U.S. official who declined to be named said most of the legal challenges were nearly a decade old — and that he currently has no legal problems in the United States. NABEP’s record of pumping oil in Venezuela made Betancourt the best partner to help boost output under the arrangement, the official said.
Reuters could not determine precisely when U.S. federal prosecutors paused their investigation into Betancourt or whether it came in exchange for his cooperation with the Trump administration.
Sarah Chouraqui, NABEP’s lawyer, said Betancourt had a strong record of operating in complex energy markets. “The allegations in question have been examined extensively by authorities in multiple jurisdictions, and no charges have been brought against him,” she said in an email.
Chouraqui did not address questions about his assistance to the Trump administration or his legal cases.
INFORMATION THAT HELPED ENFORCE U.S. BLOCKADE
In the months before Maduro’s capture, the billionaire provided information that helped enforce a U.S. naval blockade targeting sanctioned oil tankers operating in Venezuela, which led to the seizure or interdiction of more than a dozen vessels, according to the four people who spoke on condition of anonymity. He also facilitated negotiations with officials including Delcy Rodriguez, who became interim president after Maduro’s capture.
The Venezuelan government did not respond to requests for comment.
After Maduro’s removal, Betancourt’s role as a key intermediary continued, helping broker oil deals and other partnerships and continuing to assist communications between Washington and Caracas to kickstart Venezuela’s economy, according to seven sources.
In January, Betancourt helped broker a key oil trading agreement that has led to the export of more than 135 million barrels of crude and fuel to the United States, Europe, India, and the Caribbean so far, according to vessel monitoring data and six people with knowledge of the negotiations. That’s about half of all oil exports through the end of August.
Reuters could not determine his exact role in the discussions.
Betancourt has also popped in on meetings at Venezuela’s Miraflores presidential palace, according to two people familiar with the matter. He was also at Miraflores during this week’s visit by U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright, Wright told reporters, though Betancourt did not appear with Wright and Rodriguez at a signing ceremony for oil deals.
Betancourt has been investigated in the United States, Spain, and Switzerland but never indicted.
Earlier this year, U.S. federal prosecutors in Florida paused their investigation into Betancourt in connection with an alleged plan that involved embezzling over $1 billion from Venezuela’s state-owned oil company and laundering it through real estate in Miami and bank accounts in Malta and Switzerland.
Two of those people said U.S. prosecutors had been subsequently discouraged by supervisors from investigating Betancourt further.
Prosecutors on the case were not given a rationale, four people familiar with the case said.
After the investigation stalled, U.S. officials pressured the Swiss government to ease its inquiries into the tycoon, said four people familiar with the matter. Switzerland, which was also investigating Betancourt for money-laundering, dropped its request to extradite him from the United Kingdom in May, said the sources.
The Zurich Public Prosecutor’s Office declined to comment on whether the United States influenced the decision to withdraw its extradition request, but said the case against Betancourt was still proceeding.
"The extradition request was withdrawn because of particular aspects of UK extradition law, which we cannot discuss in detail,” the Office said. “This step concerns only the extradition proceedings in the UK. The criminal proceedings against the accused are otherwise unaffected and will continue."
The withdrawal was unusual, said Mark Pieth, a Swiss legal scholar and anti-corruption expert. “You would not do that if the case is continuing,” he said.
The United Kingdom’s Home Office declined to comment.
A YOUNG GENERATION OF BUSINESS LEADERS
Betancourt is a prominent member of the so-called Bolichicos — a younger generation of businesspeople who amassed fortunes during the administration of former Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez. His company Derwick Associates won roughly $2 billion in government contracts to build power plants during the country's electricity crisis in the 2010s — some without competitive bidding — despite having little construction experience.
Government data later showed many of the plants operated at a fraction of their intended capacity or not at all, as Venezuela's power grid continued to suffer widespread blackouts. Betancourt and Derwick have repeatedly denied wrongdoing and said the facilities were completed and that later failures resulted from mismanagement by state authorities. Rodriguez told a press conference on Wednesday that all legal proceedings against Betancourt’s companies in Venezuela were dismissed years ago.
In 2012, Betancourt entered into a partnership with state-controlled company PDVSA to operate mature fields in western Venezuela. These would eventually become the core production of NABEP, which Betancourt co-founded with Florida billionaire Harry Sargeant in April 2024. Sargeant sold his shares in NABEP last month.
Mauricio Claver-Carone, a Miami businessman and former Trump administration adviser who implemented U.S. policy in Caracas in an unofficial role, told Reuters last month that Betancourt is a useful intermediary between the Trump administration and Rodriguez because he understands the oil business in both countries. He added that Betancourt had been helpful to the first Trump administration.
But several former U.S. intelligence officials, prosecutors, and diplomats privately expressed concern regarding Betancourt's influence on U.S. policy because of the previous investigation in the U.S. and ongoing investigation in Switzerland, as well as his proximity to high-ranking officials from the former Hugo Chavez and Maduro governments.
Federal prosecutors are “scratching their heads,” said one former prosecutor with knowledge of the situation.
Before the Miami-based investigation into Betancourt was put on hold, six sources said he had been identified as an unnamed unindicted co-conspirator in an alleged plan by former Venezuelan energy officials and their associates to launder more than $1 billion misappropriated from the state-owned PDVSA oil company. Ten people have been indicted since 2018.
In Spain, authorities launched a new investigation into Betancourt for money laundering last year involving $4 billion allegedly embezzled from PDVSA, according to Spanish newspaper El Pais.
Reuters was unable to determine if he remained under investigation.
Spain’s National Court and the Venezuelan state oil company did not respond to requests for comment.
Once he was free to leave the UK, Betancourt traveled to Venezuela in late June and again in July, both times departing from West Palm Beach, Florida, according to flight manifests seen by Reuters.
Betancourt’s lawyer Chouraqui did not comment on his travel.
According to last week’s announcement, the U.S. gains access to about one-fifth of Venezuela’s crude reserves for decades. The Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Capital takes a 35% stake in North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP), Betancourt’s company and a known crude producer in Venezuela. The State Department gets the right to buy 20% of NABEP’s oil at cost, and preferential access to the remaining 80% of output.
The deal marks a striking change of fortune for Betancourt, who four people familiar with U.S. policy in Venezuela said was key to U.S. strategy and planning in the lead-up to the January 3 operation that removed former President Maduro from power and flew him to New York to face charges of drug-trafficking, which Maduro denies.
Asked about the investigations of Betancourt, a U.S. official who declined to be named said most of the legal challenges were nearly a decade old — and that he currently has no legal problems in the United States. NABEP’s record of pumping oil in Venezuela made Betancourt the best partner to help boost output under the arrangement, the official said.
Reuters could not determine precisely when U.S. federal prosecutors paused their investigation into Betancourt or whether it came in exchange for his cooperation with the Trump administration.
Sarah Chouraqui, NABEP’s lawyer, said Betancourt had a strong record of operating in complex energy markets. “The allegations in question have been examined extensively by authorities in multiple jurisdictions, and no charges have been brought against him,” she said in an email.
Chouraqui did not address questions about his assistance to the Trump administration or his legal cases.
INFORMATION THAT HELPED ENFORCE U.S. BLOCKADE
In the months before Maduro’s capture, the billionaire provided information that helped enforce a U.S. naval blockade targeting sanctioned oil tankers operating in Venezuela, which led to the seizure or interdiction of more than a dozen vessels, according to the four people who spoke on condition of anonymity. He also facilitated negotiations with officials including Delcy Rodriguez, who became interim president after Maduro’s capture.
The Venezuelan government did not respond to requests for comment.
After Maduro’s removal, Betancourt’s role as a key intermediary continued, helping broker oil deals and other partnerships and continuing to assist communications between Washington and Caracas to kickstart Venezuela’s economy, according to seven sources.
In January, Betancourt helped broker a key oil trading agreement that has led to the export of more than 135 million barrels of crude and fuel to the United States, Europe, India, and the Caribbean so far, according to vessel monitoring data and six people with knowledge of the negotiations. That’s about half of all oil exports through the end of August.
Reuters could not determine his exact role in the discussions.
Betancourt has also popped in on meetings at Venezuela’s Miraflores presidential palace, according to two people familiar with the matter. He was also at Miraflores during this week’s visit by U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright, Wright told reporters, though Betancourt did not appear with Wright and Rodriguez at a signing ceremony for oil deals.
Betancourt has been investigated in the United States, Spain, and Switzerland but never indicted.
Earlier this year, U.S. federal prosecutors in Florida paused their investigation into Betancourt in connection with an alleged plan that involved embezzling over $1 billion from Venezuela’s state-owned oil company and laundering it through real estate in Miami and bank accounts in Malta and Switzerland.
Two of those people said U.S. prosecutors had been subsequently discouraged by supervisors from investigating Betancourt further.
Prosecutors on the case were not given a rationale, four people familiar with the case said.
After the investigation stalled, U.S. officials pressured the Swiss government to ease its inquiries into the tycoon, said four people familiar with the matter. Switzerland, which was also investigating Betancourt for money-laundering, dropped its request to extradite him from the United Kingdom in May, said the sources.
The Zurich Public Prosecutor’s Office declined to comment on whether the United States influenced the decision to withdraw its extradition request, but said the case against Betancourt was still proceeding.
"The extradition request was withdrawn because of particular aspects of UK extradition law, which we cannot discuss in detail,” the Office said. “This step concerns only the extradition proceedings in the UK. The criminal proceedings against the accused are otherwise unaffected and will continue."
The withdrawal was unusual, said Mark Pieth, a Swiss legal scholar and anti-corruption expert. “You would not do that if the case is continuing,” he said.
The United Kingdom’s Home Office declined to comment.
A YOUNG GENERATION OF BUSINESS LEADERS
Betancourt is a prominent member of the so-called Bolichicos — a younger generation of businesspeople who amassed fortunes during the administration of former Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez. His company Derwick Associates won roughly $2 billion in government contracts to build power plants during the country's electricity crisis in the 2010s — some without competitive bidding — despite having little construction experience.
Government data later showed many of the plants operated at a fraction of their intended capacity or not at all, as Venezuela's power grid continued to suffer widespread blackouts. Betancourt and Derwick have repeatedly denied wrongdoing and said the facilities were completed and that later failures resulted from mismanagement by state authorities. Rodriguez told a press conference on Wednesday that all legal proceedings against Betancourt’s companies in Venezuela were dismissed years ago.
In 2012, Betancourt entered into a partnership with state-controlled company PDVSA to operate mature fields in western Venezuela. These would eventually become the core production of NABEP, which Betancourt co-founded with Florida billionaire Harry Sargeant in April 2024. Sargeant sold his shares in NABEP last month.
Mauricio Claver-Carone, a Miami businessman and former Trump administration adviser who implemented U.S. policy in Caracas in an unofficial role, told Reuters last month that Betancourt is a useful intermediary between the Trump administration and Rodriguez because he understands the oil business in both countries. He added that Betancourt had been helpful to the first Trump administration.
But several former U.S. intelligence officials, prosecutors, and diplomats privately expressed concern regarding Betancourt's influence on U.S. policy because of the previous investigation in the U.S. and ongoing investigation in Switzerland, as well as his proximity to high-ranking officials from the former Hugo Chavez and Maduro governments.
Federal prosecutors are “scratching their heads,” said one former prosecutor with knowledge of the situation.
Before the Miami-based investigation into Betancourt was put on hold, six sources said he had been identified as an unnamed unindicted co-conspirator in an alleged plan by former Venezuelan energy officials and their associates to launder more than $1 billion misappropriated from the state-owned PDVSA oil company. Ten people have been indicted since 2018.
In Spain, authorities launched a new investigation into Betancourt for money laundering last year involving $4 billion allegedly embezzled from PDVSA, according to Spanish newspaper El Pais.
Reuters was unable to determine if he remained under investigation.
Spain’s National Court and the Venezuelan state oil company did not respond to requests for comment.
Once he was free to leave the UK, Betancourt traveled to Venezuela in late June and again in July, both times departing from West Palm Beach, Florida, according to flight manifests seen by Reuters.
Betancourt’s lawyer Chouraqui did not comment on his travel.
What the US militarization of Latin America could look like
By Carlos H. Brandt - Sep 6, 2026
Aljazeera
pdf
Link to Internet (if no paywall or limited free access):
Summary
The United States is increasing military activity in Latin America through the Americas Counter-Cartel Coalition (ACCC), raising concerns about a return to coercive US policies. The ACCC, which includes 17 Latin American and Caribbean nations, aims to counter drug trafficking and “malign foreign influences,” particularly from China. This militarization, reminiscent of the Monroe Doctrine, could undermine democracy, increase violence, and divert resources from vital sectors in Latin American societies.
Key Points
- Expanding Military Influence & The New "Monroe Doctrine"
- Washington is leveraging drug enforcement to re-establish coercive hegemony, target organized crime, and counter Chinese influence across the Western Hemisphere.
- High-profile operations—including joint strikes in Venezuela, lethal maritime attacks, and expanded authorization in Colombia—mark a dramatic turn toward direct foreign military intervention.
- The strategy relies on deep command-and-control integration with regional partners while demanding that local militaries increase their own defense spending.
- Historical Precedents & Societal Risks
- Historical interventions like Plan Colombia show that aggressive militarization routinely fails to stop drug production while escalating civilian violence, human rights abuses, and local instability.
- Demands for higher defense spending threaten to starve critical public sectors like healthcare, education, and housing, fueling social unrest.
- US pressure on coalition members to exit the International Criminal Court shields foreign troops from accountability, eroding local sovereignty, weakening democratic institutions, and enabling authoritarianism.
Article's Full Text:
Latin America is seeing growing military activity by the United States. Under the umbrella of the Americas Counter-Cartel Coalition (ACCC), launched by President Donald Trump in March, US forces are carrying out strikes on vessels suspected of drug trafficking, while US officials are deepening ties and cooperation with Latin American militaries.
This reflects the growing push from Washington towards militarization of the region, as left-wing politics decline. For Latin America, this may spell the return of coercive US policies.
The projection of US military power, whether through coordinated operations, US boots on the ground, or the use of regional bases, will not help improve regional security and fight crime. If anything, it could undermine democracy and usher in more violence and instability.
Return of the Monroe Doctrine
Apart from the US, the ACCC includes 17 Latin American and Caribbean nations: Argentina, Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guyana, Guatemala, Paraguay, Jamaica, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, Honduras, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, and Peru.
Although Venezuela is not officially part of the coalition, it appears it has opened up its territory for US operations. With its informal participation, the ACCC is able to complete the “Andean arc”, which accounts for the entirety of the cocaine production distributed and sold in the US and Europe. This is also where many of the region’s organized crime groups operate.
But the coalition appears to be about more than just narcotics. Trump has said that the ACCC’s mandate is to counter “malign foreign influences from outside the Western Hemisphere” – a veiled reference to China.
The fact that the ACCC was created in Florida just two months after the US army had carried out a ground operation in Venezuela and deposed its president, Nicolas Maduro, was also significant.
Another step in that direction came on August 4, when the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) announced the creation of the Western Hemisphere Joint Task Force, which will “synchronize U.S. military operations with allies and partners to counter threats, strengthen regional security and respond rapidly to crises across the Western Hemisphere”. The new task force will integrate command and control of the 18 members of the ACCC.
Washington is clearly seeking to reassert coercive hegemony over the region. It wants to exert greater influence and control over security and defense decisions in the region, in what appears to be a resurrection of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, now renamed the Trump Corollary.
Militarization of Latin America
Recent operations in the region have shed light on what a renewed US force projection might look like. In June, Trump revealed on Truth Social that the US Army, acting in coordination with Venezuelan authorities, carried out an air strike targeting Hector Guerrero Flores, leader of the criminal gang, Tren de Aragua, in Bolívar state. In a statement, the Venezuelan government later acknowledged the joint action by both countries.
In late August and early September, the newly created Western Hemisphere Joint Task Force attacked several suspected vessels, killing at least two people. This was a continuation of the “Southern Spear” operation, which to date has killed at least 220 people with no investigation launched into whether they were all indeed involved in drug trafficking.
Added to this is the announcement made by Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, that newly inaugurated Colombian President Abelardo de la Espriella has authorized the US to conduct military operations in Colombia “to combat narco-terrorism”.
All of this means the US is seeking greater military reach in Latin America, whether in the form of bilateral cooperation through joint operations or unilateral action involving overflights of the countries’ territories and even access to national military bases. There will likely be US troops on the ground involved in operations to neutralize whatever activities the US perceives as a threat.
Latin America is not new to US military intervention. During the Cold War, Washington was extensively involved in mostly covert activity in the region, but there were also overt operations, such as the invasion of the Bay of Pigs in Cuba and of the island nation of Grenada. In many cases, the civilian population faced violence as a result of the US interventions.
After the Cold War, US involvement took the shape of anti-drug campaigns, which similarly did not produce positive outcomes for local communities. Take the example of Plan Colombia (2000-2015), which was meant to combat drug trafficking and leftist insurgent groups.
Although it contributed to the weakening of insurgent organizations, it also produced a lot of violence, including by the US-trained Colombian military, which was accused of killing thousands of civilians and claiming they were rebels to “show results”. US troops stationed in Colombia as part of training programs were also accused of raping dozens of Colombian women and girls and smuggling drugs and weapons.
Plan Colombia, which received $10bn in US funding, ended up militarizing Colombia’s security agenda, intensifying armed conflicts and cartel violence, as well as the persecution of union leaders, peasants, and the civilian population. It failed to stop the proliferation of coca plantations.
Given the past historical record, the US push for the militarization of Latin American states and a greater military presence in the region is unlikely to bring more security.
Impact on Latin American societies
The effect of greater US military engagement in the region will not be limited to the security sector only.
Washington has made clear that membership in the ACCC should translate into greater national spending on defense. That means national budgets will be thrown out of balance, and resources will be diverted away from vital sectors such as education, health care, housing, and social security. Worsening social services provision will likely lead to more public discontent.
Then there is the question of sovereignty. The US will seek to influence the design of security and defense policies—particularly with regard to maintaining internal security and the scope of military cooperation. Washington can and will put pressure on governments and legislatures to align with its agenda.
The fact that US officials have insisted that ACCC member countries withdraw from the International Criminal Court does not bode well for transparency and accountability. Clearly, the aim is to ensure impunity for US armed forces and their allies.
It is highly likely that a lack of transparency and accountability will exacerbate the authoritarian trend that has been emerging in Latin American politics, with well-known consequences: weakening of institutions, increased discretionary power, the erosion of the rule of law, and, consequently, a decline in citizens’ quality of life.
For the Trump administration, the ACCC may be an important foreign policy win. But for Latin American societies, it is yet another threat to their fragile democratic institutions.
This reflects the growing push from Washington towards militarization of the region, as left-wing politics decline. For Latin America, this may spell the return of coercive US policies.
The projection of US military power, whether through coordinated operations, US boots on the ground, or the use of regional bases, will not help improve regional security and fight crime. If anything, it could undermine democracy and usher in more violence and instability.
Return of the Monroe Doctrine
Apart from the US, the ACCC includes 17 Latin American and Caribbean nations: Argentina, Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guyana, Guatemala, Paraguay, Jamaica, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, Honduras, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, and Peru.
Although Venezuela is not officially part of the coalition, it appears it has opened up its territory for US operations. With its informal participation, the ACCC is able to complete the “Andean arc”, which accounts for the entirety of the cocaine production distributed and sold in the US and Europe. This is also where many of the region’s organized crime groups operate.
But the coalition appears to be about more than just narcotics. Trump has said that the ACCC’s mandate is to counter “malign foreign influences from outside the Western Hemisphere” – a veiled reference to China.
The fact that the ACCC was created in Florida just two months after the US army had carried out a ground operation in Venezuela and deposed its president, Nicolas Maduro, was also significant.
Another step in that direction came on August 4, when the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) announced the creation of the Western Hemisphere Joint Task Force, which will “synchronize U.S. military operations with allies and partners to counter threats, strengthen regional security and respond rapidly to crises across the Western Hemisphere”. The new task force will integrate command and control of the 18 members of the ACCC.
Washington is clearly seeking to reassert coercive hegemony over the region. It wants to exert greater influence and control over security and defense decisions in the region, in what appears to be a resurrection of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, now renamed the Trump Corollary.
Militarization of Latin America
Recent operations in the region have shed light on what a renewed US force projection might look like. In June, Trump revealed on Truth Social that the US Army, acting in coordination with Venezuelan authorities, carried out an air strike targeting Hector Guerrero Flores, leader of the criminal gang, Tren de Aragua, in Bolívar state. In a statement, the Venezuelan government later acknowledged the joint action by both countries.
In late August and early September, the newly created Western Hemisphere Joint Task Force attacked several suspected vessels, killing at least two people. This was a continuation of the “Southern Spear” operation, which to date has killed at least 220 people with no investigation launched into whether they were all indeed involved in drug trafficking.
Added to this is the announcement made by Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, that newly inaugurated Colombian President Abelardo de la Espriella has authorized the US to conduct military operations in Colombia “to combat narco-terrorism”.
All of this means the US is seeking greater military reach in Latin America, whether in the form of bilateral cooperation through joint operations or unilateral action involving overflights of the countries’ territories and even access to national military bases. There will likely be US troops on the ground involved in operations to neutralize whatever activities the US perceives as a threat.
Latin America is not new to US military intervention. During the Cold War, Washington was extensively involved in mostly covert activity in the region, but there were also overt operations, such as the invasion of the Bay of Pigs in Cuba and of the island nation of Grenada. In many cases, the civilian population faced violence as a result of the US interventions.
After the Cold War, US involvement took the shape of anti-drug campaigns, which similarly did not produce positive outcomes for local communities. Take the example of Plan Colombia (2000-2015), which was meant to combat drug trafficking and leftist insurgent groups.
Although it contributed to the weakening of insurgent organizations, it also produced a lot of violence, including by the US-trained Colombian military, which was accused of killing thousands of civilians and claiming they were rebels to “show results”. US troops stationed in Colombia as part of training programs were also accused of raping dozens of Colombian women and girls and smuggling drugs and weapons.
Plan Colombia, which received $10bn in US funding, ended up militarizing Colombia’s security agenda, intensifying armed conflicts and cartel violence, as well as the persecution of union leaders, peasants, and the civilian population. It failed to stop the proliferation of coca plantations.
Given the past historical record, the US push for the militarization of Latin American states and a greater military presence in the region is unlikely to bring more security.
Impact on Latin American societies
The effect of greater US military engagement in the region will not be limited to the security sector only.
Washington has made clear that membership in the ACCC should translate into greater national spending on defense. That means national budgets will be thrown out of balance, and resources will be diverted away from vital sectors such as education, health care, housing, and social security. Worsening social services provision will likely lead to more public discontent.
Then there is the question of sovereignty. The US will seek to influence the design of security and defense policies—particularly with regard to maintaining internal security and the scope of military cooperation. Washington can and will put pressure on governments and legislatures to align with its agenda.
The fact that US officials have insisted that ACCC member countries withdraw from the International Criminal Court does not bode well for transparency and accountability. Clearly, the aim is to ensure impunity for US armed forces and their allies.
It is highly likely that a lack of transparency and accountability will exacerbate the authoritarian trend that has been emerging in Latin American politics, with well-known consequences: weakening of institutions, increased discretionary power, the erosion of the rule of law, and, consequently, a decline in citizens’ quality of life.
For the Trump administration, the ACCC may be an important foreign policy win. But for Latin American societies, it is yet another threat to their fragile democratic institutions.
More voters identifying as Democrats and not calling themselves Republican
By Roque Planas - Sep 5, 2026
The Guardian
pdf
Link to Internet (if no paywall or limited free access):
Summary
Gallup data shows a shift in voter identification, with 49% leaning Democrat and 39% Republican, a 10-point advantage for Democrats. This marks a reversal from the previous quarter and the largest Democratic advantage since 2008, potentially driven by Trump’s unpopularity.
Key Points
- Gallup’s latest quarterly data reveals a significant shift in voter alignment, with 49% of respondents leaning Democratic compared to 39% leaning Republican.
- This 10-point margin marks the largest Democratic advantage since 2008 and a direct reversal of the four-point Republican edge held during the fourth quarter of 2024.
- The political shift is driven by a drop in Donald Trump’s popularity during his second term, with his approval rating falling from 52% at his January 2025 inauguration to 38%, alongside a 58% disapproval rating.
- Voter dissatisfaction stems from key second-term policies, including federal workforce cuts, new tariffs, high-spending legislation, and the conflict with Iran.
- Capitalizing on this momentum, Democrats are favored to retake the House of Representatives in the upcoming November midterms, while also seeing improved polling prospects in the Senate.
- Despite party-preference shifts, the long-term trend shows a growing number of Americans identifying as political independents, rising from one-third of voters in 2002 to 45% last year.
Article's Full Text:
More voters are identifying as Democrats and shying away from calling themselves Republican, according to the latest quarterly data published by Gallup.
Some 49% of voters surveyed leaned Democrat, including independent voters asked to pick one party or the other. Only 39% of respondents leaned Republican.
That 10-point spread marks a sharp reversal from the four-point advantage that Republicans held over Democrats in the fourth quarter of 2024, when voters sent Donald Trump back to the White House and Republicans swept both houses of Congress. Democrats are seeing their most sizable advantage since 2008, when Barack Obama was elected president, according to the New York Times.
The data offers the latest evidence that Trump’s second term has proved unpopular with voters, driving a potential backlash.
Trump’s approval rating stood at 52% at the time of his second inauguration in January of 2025, according to an average of polls published by the New York Times.
But his popularity dwindled immediately, as he cleaved the federal workforce, imposed price-inflating tariffs, passed a profligate spending bill and launched a rudderless war with Iran. Some 58% of voters now disapprove of his performance, with only 38% approving, according to the Times.
Democrats are hoping to take advantage of Trump’s tanking popularity. Liberals are likely to retake the US House of Representatives in midterm elections this November. The party is much less certain to retake the US Senate, though polling is giving Democrats reasons to feel optimistic.
A growing share of American voters have not identified with either party in recent years. Back in 2002, roughly a third of voters surveyed by Gallup identified as either Republican, Democrat or independent. By last year, 45% of respondents called themselves independents, with only 27% identifying as either Democrat or Republican.
Some 49% of voters surveyed leaned Democrat, including independent voters asked to pick one party or the other. Only 39% of respondents leaned Republican.
That 10-point spread marks a sharp reversal from the four-point advantage that Republicans held over Democrats in the fourth quarter of 2024, when voters sent Donald Trump back to the White House and Republicans swept both houses of Congress. Democrats are seeing their most sizable advantage since 2008, when Barack Obama was elected president, according to the New York Times.
The data offers the latest evidence that Trump’s second term has proved unpopular with voters, driving a potential backlash.
Trump’s approval rating stood at 52% at the time of his second inauguration in January of 2025, according to an average of polls published by the New York Times.
But his popularity dwindled immediately, as he cleaved the federal workforce, imposed price-inflating tariffs, passed a profligate spending bill and launched a rudderless war with Iran. Some 58% of voters now disapprove of his performance, with only 38% approving, according to the Times.
Democrats are hoping to take advantage of Trump’s tanking popularity. Liberals are likely to retake the US House of Representatives in midterm elections this November. The party is much less certain to retake the US Senate, though polling is giving Democrats reasons to feel optimistic.
A growing share of American voters have not identified with either party in recent years. Back in 2002, roughly a third of voters surveyed by Gallup identified as either Republican, Democrat or independent. By last year, 45% of respondents called themselves independents, with only 27% identifying as either Democrat or Republican.
Allies into foes. Foes into allies. What's behind Trump's world order assault?
By Kim Hjelmgaard and Michel Collins - Sep 5, 2026
USA Today
pdf
Link to Internet (if no paywall or limited free access):
Summary
President Trump’s approach to foreign policy, characterized by skepticism towards alliances and a focus on bilateral relations, has been met with criticism from the U.S. foreign policy establishment. While some argue that Trump’s actions are hastening the decline of American power, others suggest that his approach is forcing a reordering of alliances and potentially leading to a more multipolar world order. However, the long-term impact of Trump’s policies remains uncertain.
The Trump administration’s foreign policy, characterized by a transactional approach and close relationships with authoritarian leaders, has raised concerns among allies. While Trump has achieved some successes, such as increased defense spending from NATO allies, his aggressive tactics, like tariffs on Canada, have sparked trade wars and economic instability. Critics argue that Trump’s actions are undermining U.S. influence and creating long-term challenges for international relations.
The Trump administration’s foreign policy, characterized by a transactional approach and close relationships with authoritarian leaders, has raised concerns among allies. While Trump has achieved some successes, such as increased defense spending from NATO allies, his aggressive tactics, like tariffs on Canada, have sparked trade wars and economic instability. Critics argue that Trump’s actions are undermining U.S. influence and creating long-term challenges for international relations.
Key Points
- Transactional & Disruptive Strategy
- Donald Trump’s approach to global diplomacy relies heavily on transactional leverage and high-pressure tactics, treating long-standing alliances, trade agreements, and security umbrellas as bargaining chips rather than permanent commitments.
- Strain on Traditional Alliances
- By threatening to withdraw support, imposing steep tariffs, demanding higher defense contributions, and floating aggressive territorial proposals, the administration has deeply unsettled historical allies like NATO members, South Korea, and Canada.
- Courting Authoritarian Adversaries
- Trump favors direct, personal diplomacy with non-democratic leaders—including those in Russia, China, and North Korea—preferring bilateral deals free from traditional diplomatic expectations or institutional constraints.
- Emergence of "Complex Multipolarity"
- Skepticism toward international institutions and traditional security arrangements is gradually pushing the global system away from U.S. dominance toward a fragmented structure where power is distributed among several major regional players.
- Blurring Public Policy and Economic Interests
- Foreign policy moves often intersect directly with financial, commercial, and personal economic leverage, drawing criticism over potential conflicts of interest while extracting major business and investment pledges from foreign governments.
- Short-Term Gains vs. Long-Term Reliability
- While aggressive pressure tactics have successfully coerced allies into increasing military spending and offering investment commitments, foreign partners are increasingly viewing the U.S. as an unreliable partner and preparing strategies to reduce their future dependence on American power.
Article's Full Text:
Bomb Oman. Abandon South Korea. Pull out of NATO. Seize Greenland. Maybe Canada, too.
Order U.S. special forces to snatch a troublesome Latin American dictator. Then grab that country's oil reserves.
For the best part of a decade since he first entered the disorderly world of global diplomacy, President Donald Trump has played fast and loose with U.S. foreign policy. He's repeatedly threatened traditional American allies. He's spent large amounts of time courting and flirting with unpredictable adversaries like North Korea and Russia.
The U.S. foreign policy establishment has bristled at this approach, which appears to make allies of foes, and foes of allies. Markets, which crave certainty, don't like it either. U.S. international partners have struggled to adapt to it.
But is there a defensible logic to this turn-on-your-friends, win-over-your-foes strategy? Or is it simply hastening the decline of American power at a time when China is matching, if not surpassing, the U.S. in various hyper-competitive fields from technology to military advancements, from scientific research to extending the reach of its soft power?
Some political scientists and former government officials say the answer is Yes and No. Sort of. Somewhat. Alliances are shaking up, resetting, reordering. But it's unclear if it's a permanent, irreversible, and wholly unprecedented shift.
And, they say, it may not be all for the bad.
"The establishment is apoplectic. In my career, I've never seen them so downcast and so convinced that our leader is making mistake after mistake," said Lyle Goldstein of the reshuffling of the longtime American overseas playbook. He's the director of the China Initiative at Brown University’s Watson School of International and Public Affairs.
"I do agree Trump's making a lot of mistakes. However, I have some sympathy for his skepticism of alliances. It's obvious that one reason the United States has fallen behind in so many indicators of living standards is that we are carrying much more of the burden than other countries," said Goldstein, who also serves as director of the Asia Program at the Washington think tank Defense Priorities, which argues for a smaller global U.S. military footprint.
Goldstein said Trump's apparent disdain for international institutions such as NATO and the United Nations that have been the main venues for Western cooperation and security since the end of World War II is gradually forcing a new world order that he calls "complex multipolarity." That's where power could eventually be spread among several major nations or regions rather than being concentrated in the hands of two superpowers: the United States and China.
Still, Daniel Fried, former U.S. ambassador to Poland and a fellow at the Atlantic Council, an international affairs think tank based in Washington, said he is not yet ready to say that Trump is entirely remaking the world order.
To change the world order, Fried said, "you’ve got to have some structure as an alternative." Fried also worked as a special assistant to former Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.
"I’m not sure there is one in mind or that the Trump administration has settled on what it wants. And I’m not sure how much will be lasting after the end of this administration."
Trump seems to be focused more on consolidating American power than remaking the international order, said Dan Hamilton, a foreign policy expert at the Washington-based Brookings Institution’s Center on the U.S. and Europe.
“He believes that international rules are simply constraining,” Hamilton said. “If you’re the biggest power in the world, then everybody is trying to tie you down, and you don’t like it.”
The scope of what the Trump administration has sought to achieve on the world stage has been wide-ranging and the pace relentless. It started in Trump's first term when he expressed deep skepticism of multilateralism, deploying a barrage of executive orders that pulled the U.S. out of the Paris climate agreement, withdrew it from the Iran nuclear agreement, and left the global-health-promoting World Health Organization in the U.S.'s rear-view mirror.
Trump recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital and moved the U.S. embassy there in defiance of decades of U.S. practice to be sensitive to Palestinian political aspirations.
He also started his assault − accelerated during his second term − on free trade by exiting the Trans-Pacific Partnership with 12 Pacific Rim nations and replacing the North American Free Trade Agreement with Canada and Mexico with the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, which is currently toiling in a half-dead state because his administration has neither renewed nor killed the pact.
What's clear, said Robert Muggah, cofounder of Canada-based geopolitical risk and security consultancy SecDev Group and the Igarapé Institute, a Brazil-based think tank, is that Trump approaches alliances as explicit transactions.
"He has aggressively pressed some of America’s closest partners, including Canada, Japan, South Korea, and European countries, for concessions on trade, defense, and market access," he said.
"He sees dependence on the United States as leverage. Countries that rely heavily on the American market or security umbrella have more to lose from a rupture. That gives Washington considerable room to exert pressure."
And unrelenting pressure, and what appears to be genuine enthusiasm for personal diplomacy with leaders such as Russia's Vladimir Putin, China's Xi Jinping, and North Korea's Kim Jong Un, has been the name of Trump's game since he returned to the White House. He's intimidated NATO ally Denmark by floating the idea of annexing its Greenland territory for its natural resources and to ward off seaborne national security threats from China and Russia. He's mulled, in an informal fireside-chat way, about doing a "friendly takeover" of Cuba.
Over and over again, he's talked down the utility of the 77-year-old "paper tiger" NATO military alliance.
"Kim Jong Un has always treated me with great respect, and we’ve met on numerous occasions, actually, two primary occasions − spoken and spent time. I understand him. He understands me,” Trump said after announcing he'd ordered the Pentagon to scale back military exercises with South Korea.
The drills with South Korea are designed to help prepare Seoul for a possible war with Pyongyang, its secretive and volatile nuclear-armed rival and neighbor.
For decades, security on the Korean Peninsula has rested on a single assumption, wrote Ju Hyung Kim, a specialist in the region, in a recent article in 38 North, a North Korea-related analysis website: "that in the event of an all-out war, U.S. reinforcement would be swiftly introduced both from Japan and the continental United States . . . such an assumption is increasingly being questioned."
The Trump administration scaled back the military exercises with South Korea as a gesture toward Pyongyang, even as North Korea continued missile launches, providing weapons and ammunition to Russia for its war in Ukraine, and as Kim has rebuffed renewed nuclear talks on terms that would satisfy Washington.
And Trump’s friendly tone and relationship with Putin − coming at the same time he has belittled Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy − has caused skepticism and alarm in Europe, which views Russia’s war on Ukraine as a long-term threat to the security of the entire continent.
"For Trump, relations with adversarial and authoritarian leaders carry fewer expectations and less institutional baggage," said Muggah, the cofounder of SecDev and the Igarapé Institute. "He seems to prefer dealing directly with such leaders, especially when he can portray himself as the person who gets the deal done."
Trump probably won't bomb Oman, but he's threatened to because he's frustrated the Gulf state has explored an agreement with its clerical leaders to fully open the Strait of Hormuz shipping waterway that's been largely closed because of the war of choice he started − and is struggling to end − in coordination with Israel on Iran in February.
"It's becoming conventional wisdom that the Iran war is a fiasco of the first order," said Goldstein, from Brown's Watson School and Defense Priorities. "There is an argument out there that if the United States is struggling to fight a middle power like Iran, it may be totally inconceivable that we could go head-to-head against China."
Earlier presidents have, like Trump, also pursued transactional foreign policies. Theodore Roosevelt and his successors used military intervention in Latin America to protect U.S. financial interests, while Harry Truman and John F. Kennedy later used foreign aid and land reform as an inducement to reduce communism’s appeal.
But no president has appeared to so directly link diplomacy to his own economic interests, according to Patrick Shea, a professor of international relations and global governance at the University of Glasgow, Scotland.
The Trump Organization has expanded its Gulf business ties through Trump-branded developments in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates − all countries that have sought to influence his Middle East policies. Trump's son-in-law, Jared Kushner’s investment firm, secured $2 billion from Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund about six months after he left the White House, prompting conflict-of-interest concerns that Kushner has rejected.
Trump also accepted a Boeing 747-8 from Qatar, valued at roughly $400 million. The aircraft now serves as Air Force One and is expected eventually to be transferred to Trump’s presidential library. He netted more than a billion dollars in crypto-related earnings in 2025, according to his financial disclosure reports. One of the biggest investors in this part of his private business is a Saudi real-estate developer with close ties to the Saudi government.
However, there may be some traces of method in what many of Trump's critics view as his foreign-policy madness.
On some issues, former presidential special assistant Fried said, the administration has a valid argument.
The administration has argued that a free-trade model has created global problems, particularly with countries like China that game the system and exploit the rules. Trump also has been highly critical of NATO, arguing that European countries aren’t spending enough money on the military and thus aren’t paying their fair share of the alliance’s mutual defense.
But in the case of NATO, the administration has won the argument, Fried said, because the Europeans are now boosting their defense spending and realizing they need to do more to stand on their own feet militarily.
Is it a 'loyalty test‘? The The US sent NATO allies a survey.
And yet, the administration seems to be unable to turn such victories into lasting policy, Fried said.
"There seems to be this destructive impulse that gets the better of them."
Trump's trade tactics have extracted material commitments as well.
Japan and South Korea have now agreed to U.S. investment packages worth hundreds of billions of dollars, while Europe has made substantial commitments involving American energy and investment spending. Many of these promises have yet to be delivered. But they may help explain why Trump believes pressure works.
Still, the opposite may also be true.
Trump’s tariffs on Canada, for example, have touched off a trade war with one of the United States’ closest allies. Vowing to match Trump’s duties on Canadian imports “dollar for dollar,” Canada struck back with retaliatory tariffs on $20 billion worth of U.S. products, including steel, aluminum, furniture, clothing, cheese, and seafood.
This restructuring, combined with elevated oil prices amid on-and-off-and-on-again U.S. military strikes on Iran, has sowed stability doubts among international investors and created volatility in global financial markets, opening the door for the euro to challenge the dollar as the world’s dominant currency, according to some financial analysts.
As the Iran war has faced an uncertain timeline to wind down, it has also driven up inflation fears and government borrowing costs, with yields on long-term U.S. Treasury bonds sitting near multi-year highs. This ultimately makes it more expensive for consumers to take on debt, whether for mortgages or personal, shorter-term loans.
Congress has pushed back on some of Trump’s actions, so it’s unclear even if the next president is a Republican whether they would continue, said Hamilton of the Brookings Institution.
“Certainly with a Democrat, I think a lot of it would change,” he said.
Some of Trump’s actions could easily be undone. The next president, for example, could choose to rejoin the Paris climate agreement or decide to participate again in some of the international groups that the United States pulled out of under Trump. Trump’s trade deals could be rescinded because they are not formal treaties ratified by Congress.
Trump has just a little over two years left in office, so the strategy adopted by some U.S. allies has been to try to limit the short-term damage his policies have wrought by pushing back occasionally and trying to win him over with flattery, Fried said. In the long run, though, they are looking beyond Trump, he added.
"I don’t think they’re taking Trumpism as something that will be lasting."
Trump is extracting more from American power today while giving other countries reasons to depend on it less tomorrow, Muggah said.
Order U.S. special forces to snatch a troublesome Latin American dictator. Then grab that country's oil reserves.
For the best part of a decade since he first entered the disorderly world of global diplomacy, President Donald Trump has played fast and loose with U.S. foreign policy. He's repeatedly threatened traditional American allies. He's spent large amounts of time courting and flirting with unpredictable adversaries like North Korea and Russia.
The U.S. foreign policy establishment has bristled at this approach, which appears to make allies of foes, and foes of allies. Markets, which crave certainty, don't like it either. U.S. international partners have struggled to adapt to it.
But is there a defensible logic to this turn-on-your-friends, win-over-your-foes strategy? Or is it simply hastening the decline of American power at a time when China is matching, if not surpassing, the U.S. in various hyper-competitive fields from technology to military advancements, from scientific research to extending the reach of its soft power?
Some political scientists and former government officials say the answer is Yes and No. Sort of. Somewhat. Alliances are shaking up, resetting, reordering. But it's unclear if it's a permanent, irreversible, and wholly unprecedented shift.
And, they say, it may not be all for the bad.
"The establishment is apoplectic. In my career, I've never seen them so downcast and so convinced that our leader is making mistake after mistake," said Lyle Goldstein of the reshuffling of the longtime American overseas playbook. He's the director of the China Initiative at Brown University’s Watson School of International and Public Affairs.
"I do agree Trump's making a lot of mistakes. However, I have some sympathy for his skepticism of alliances. It's obvious that one reason the United States has fallen behind in so many indicators of living standards is that we are carrying much more of the burden than other countries," said Goldstein, who also serves as director of the Asia Program at the Washington think tank Defense Priorities, which argues for a smaller global U.S. military footprint.
Goldstein said Trump's apparent disdain for international institutions such as NATO and the United Nations that have been the main venues for Western cooperation and security since the end of World War II is gradually forcing a new world order that he calls "complex multipolarity." That's where power could eventually be spread among several major nations or regions rather than being concentrated in the hands of two superpowers: the United States and China.
Still, Daniel Fried, former U.S. ambassador to Poland and a fellow at the Atlantic Council, an international affairs think tank based in Washington, said he is not yet ready to say that Trump is entirely remaking the world order.
To change the world order, Fried said, "you’ve got to have some structure as an alternative." Fried also worked as a special assistant to former Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.
"I’m not sure there is one in mind or that the Trump administration has settled on what it wants. And I’m not sure how much will be lasting after the end of this administration."
Trump seems to be focused more on consolidating American power than remaking the international order, said Dan Hamilton, a foreign policy expert at the Washington-based Brookings Institution’s Center on the U.S. and Europe.
“He believes that international rules are simply constraining,” Hamilton said. “If you’re the biggest power in the world, then everybody is trying to tie you down, and you don’t like it.”
The scope of what the Trump administration has sought to achieve on the world stage has been wide-ranging and the pace relentless. It started in Trump's first term when he expressed deep skepticism of multilateralism, deploying a barrage of executive orders that pulled the U.S. out of the Paris climate agreement, withdrew it from the Iran nuclear agreement, and left the global-health-promoting World Health Organization in the U.S.'s rear-view mirror.
Trump recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital and moved the U.S. embassy there in defiance of decades of U.S. practice to be sensitive to Palestinian political aspirations.
He also started his assault − accelerated during his second term − on free trade by exiting the Trans-Pacific Partnership with 12 Pacific Rim nations and replacing the North American Free Trade Agreement with Canada and Mexico with the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, which is currently toiling in a half-dead state because his administration has neither renewed nor killed the pact.
What's clear, said Robert Muggah, cofounder of Canada-based geopolitical risk and security consultancy SecDev Group and the Igarapé Institute, a Brazil-based think tank, is that Trump approaches alliances as explicit transactions.
"He has aggressively pressed some of America’s closest partners, including Canada, Japan, South Korea, and European countries, for concessions on trade, defense, and market access," he said.
"He sees dependence on the United States as leverage. Countries that rely heavily on the American market or security umbrella have more to lose from a rupture. That gives Washington considerable room to exert pressure."
And unrelenting pressure, and what appears to be genuine enthusiasm for personal diplomacy with leaders such as Russia's Vladimir Putin, China's Xi Jinping, and North Korea's Kim Jong Un, has been the name of Trump's game since he returned to the White House. He's intimidated NATO ally Denmark by floating the idea of annexing its Greenland territory for its natural resources and to ward off seaborne national security threats from China and Russia. He's mulled, in an informal fireside-chat way, about doing a "friendly takeover" of Cuba.
Over and over again, he's talked down the utility of the 77-year-old "paper tiger" NATO military alliance.
"Kim Jong Un has always treated me with great respect, and we’ve met on numerous occasions, actually, two primary occasions − spoken and spent time. I understand him. He understands me,” Trump said after announcing he'd ordered the Pentagon to scale back military exercises with South Korea.
The drills with South Korea are designed to help prepare Seoul for a possible war with Pyongyang, its secretive and volatile nuclear-armed rival and neighbor.
For decades, security on the Korean Peninsula has rested on a single assumption, wrote Ju Hyung Kim, a specialist in the region, in a recent article in 38 North, a North Korea-related analysis website: "that in the event of an all-out war, U.S. reinforcement would be swiftly introduced both from Japan and the continental United States . . . such an assumption is increasingly being questioned."
The Trump administration scaled back the military exercises with South Korea as a gesture toward Pyongyang, even as North Korea continued missile launches, providing weapons and ammunition to Russia for its war in Ukraine, and as Kim has rebuffed renewed nuclear talks on terms that would satisfy Washington.
And Trump’s friendly tone and relationship with Putin − coming at the same time he has belittled Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy − has caused skepticism and alarm in Europe, which views Russia’s war on Ukraine as a long-term threat to the security of the entire continent.
"For Trump, relations with adversarial and authoritarian leaders carry fewer expectations and less institutional baggage," said Muggah, the cofounder of SecDev and the Igarapé Institute. "He seems to prefer dealing directly with such leaders, especially when he can portray himself as the person who gets the deal done."
Trump probably won't bomb Oman, but he's threatened to because he's frustrated the Gulf state has explored an agreement with its clerical leaders to fully open the Strait of Hormuz shipping waterway that's been largely closed because of the war of choice he started − and is struggling to end − in coordination with Israel on Iran in February.
"It's becoming conventional wisdom that the Iran war is a fiasco of the first order," said Goldstein, from Brown's Watson School and Defense Priorities. "There is an argument out there that if the United States is struggling to fight a middle power like Iran, it may be totally inconceivable that we could go head-to-head against China."
Earlier presidents have, like Trump, also pursued transactional foreign policies. Theodore Roosevelt and his successors used military intervention in Latin America to protect U.S. financial interests, while Harry Truman and John F. Kennedy later used foreign aid and land reform as an inducement to reduce communism’s appeal.
But no president has appeared to so directly link diplomacy to his own economic interests, according to Patrick Shea, a professor of international relations and global governance at the University of Glasgow, Scotland.
The Trump Organization has expanded its Gulf business ties through Trump-branded developments in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates − all countries that have sought to influence his Middle East policies. Trump's son-in-law, Jared Kushner’s investment firm, secured $2 billion from Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund about six months after he left the White House, prompting conflict-of-interest concerns that Kushner has rejected.
Trump also accepted a Boeing 747-8 from Qatar, valued at roughly $400 million. The aircraft now serves as Air Force One and is expected eventually to be transferred to Trump’s presidential library. He netted more than a billion dollars in crypto-related earnings in 2025, according to his financial disclosure reports. One of the biggest investors in this part of his private business is a Saudi real-estate developer with close ties to the Saudi government.
However, there may be some traces of method in what many of Trump's critics view as his foreign-policy madness.
On some issues, former presidential special assistant Fried said, the administration has a valid argument.
The administration has argued that a free-trade model has created global problems, particularly with countries like China that game the system and exploit the rules. Trump also has been highly critical of NATO, arguing that European countries aren’t spending enough money on the military and thus aren’t paying their fair share of the alliance’s mutual defense.
But in the case of NATO, the administration has won the argument, Fried said, because the Europeans are now boosting their defense spending and realizing they need to do more to stand on their own feet militarily.
Is it a 'loyalty test‘? The The US sent NATO allies a survey.
And yet, the administration seems to be unable to turn such victories into lasting policy, Fried said.
"There seems to be this destructive impulse that gets the better of them."
Trump's trade tactics have extracted material commitments as well.
Japan and South Korea have now agreed to U.S. investment packages worth hundreds of billions of dollars, while Europe has made substantial commitments involving American energy and investment spending. Many of these promises have yet to be delivered. But they may help explain why Trump believes pressure works.
Still, the opposite may also be true.
Trump’s tariffs on Canada, for example, have touched off a trade war with one of the United States’ closest allies. Vowing to match Trump’s duties on Canadian imports “dollar for dollar,” Canada struck back with retaliatory tariffs on $20 billion worth of U.S. products, including steel, aluminum, furniture, clothing, cheese, and seafood.
This restructuring, combined with elevated oil prices amid on-and-off-and-on-again U.S. military strikes on Iran, has sowed stability doubts among international investors and created volatility in global financial markets, opening the door for the euro to challenge the dollar as the world’s dominant currency, according to some financial analysts.
As the Iran war has faced an uncertain timeline to wind down, it has also driven up inflation fears and government borrowing costs, with yields on long-term U.S. Treasury bonds sitting near multi-year highs. This ultimately makes it more expensive for consumers to take on debt, whether for mortgages or personal, shorter-term loans.
Congress has pushed back on some of Trump’s actions, so it’s unclear even if the next president is a Republican whether they would continue, said Hamilton of the Brookings Institution.
“Certainly with a Democrat, I think a lot of it would change,” he said.
Some of Trump’s actions could easily be undone. The next president, for example, could choose to rejoin the Paris climate agreement or decide to participate again in some of the international groups that the United States pulled out of under Trump. Trump’s trade deals could be rescinded because they are not formal treaties ratified by Congress.
Trump has just a little over two years left in office, so the strategy adopted by some U.S. allies has been to try to limit the short-term damage his policies have wrought by pushing back occasionally and trying to win him over with flattery, Fried said. In the long run, though, they are looking beyond Trump, he added.
"I don’t think they’re taking Trumpism as something that will be lasting."
Trump is extracting more from American power today while giving other countries reasons to depend on it less tomorrow, Muggah said.
In a rare flurry of trips, Xi pitches China as a stable alternative to the U.S. under Trump.
By Joshua Yang - Sep 6, 2026
Washington Post
pdf
Link to Internet (if no paywall or limited free access):
Summary
Chinese leader Xi Jinping is embarking on a series of diplomatic trips to Kyrgyzstan, Egypt, India, and the United States, aiming to position China as a stable partner for developing countries amidst perceived U.S.-driven geopolitical uncertainty. Xi’s visits, including summits with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS nations, demonstrate China’s diplomatic depth and strategic options. Notably, Xi is bypassing the United Nations General Assembly in favor of a meeting with President Trump, suggesting a preference for controlled diplomatic engagements.
Key Points
- Diplomatic Surge
- Xi Jinping is undertaking a rare multi-nation tour across Kyrgyzstan, Egypt, India, and the U.S. this September—a sharp departure from his post-pandemic habit of hosting foreign dignitaries at home rather than traveling abroad.
- Positioning as a Stable Partner
- Beijing is leveraging these visits to pitch China as a reliable, steady ally for developing nations and the Global South amid economic and political instability linked to U.S. foreign policies, trade conflicts, and secondary sanctions.
- Strategic Itinerary
- The carefully choreographed sequence of events—spanning the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Kyrgyzstan, joint exercises in Egypt, and the BRICS summit in India—allows Beijing to project strong global alliances and strategic depth ahead of a late-September White House visit with President Donald Trump.
- Exploiting Opportunities
- Xi is actively capitalizing on recent U.S. friction with other nations, using stops like Cairo—following recent U.S. sanctions on an Egyptian bank—to build solidarity and expand Chinese economic, military, and energy influence in traditionally U.S.-leaning regions.
- Controlled Engagement
- By opting for a direct summit with Trump while skipping the UN General Assembly in New York, Xi reinforces Beijing's strategy of favoring tightly controlled, high-visibility diplomatic settings over broader multilateral forums where it cannot dictate the agenda.
Article's Full Text:
Chinese leader Xi Jinping has hit the road this September for an unusual series of diplomatic trips spanning four countries, three state visits, two multilateral summits, and one widely anticipated meeting with President Donald Trump.
A key part of his agenda: a pitch for China as a stable partner, especially for developing countries, during a period of what Beijing has portrayed as U.S.-driven geopolitical uncertainty.
The visits — to Kyrgyzstan, Egypt, India, and the United States — are a collective rarity for the Chinese leader, who has sharply limited his international travel since the coronavirus pandemic. Between 2021 and 2025, U.S. presidents logged 51 visits to other countries, compared to just 25 for Xi.
Other world leaders have been more than willing to visit Xi in China, allowing him the luxury of holding court at home. But experts say he now sees openings abroad.
“Xi sees an opportunity to show that China has friends and options around the world at exactly the time when Washington is pushing away and alienating many of its partners,” said Julian Gewirtz, who served as a China director on the National Security Council under the Biden administration.
The Chinese leader began with a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) — a 10-country economic and security bloc often described as a counterbalance to U.S. influence — in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, where he met Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, among others.
Xi on Wednesday wrapped a state visit in Cairo and is set to travel to New Delhi mid-month for a summit of the BRICS nations. In late September, the Chinese leader plans to visit Washington, where Trump is set to host him at the White House for a state dinner. The pair last met in Beijing in May.
The “selective” nature of the trips leading into Xi’s visit to Washington is no coincidence, said Craig Singleton, the senior director of the China Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington think tank.
The statecraft shows “Xi can stand beside Putin, he can court the Global South and still prepare for a summit with Trump,” Singleton said. “China wants Washington to see that it has diplomatic depth and strategic options.”
Beijing’s outreach comes as many developing countries are scrambling to react to a geopolitical or economic crisis, some precipitated by the Trump administration, including the war in Iran and Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the seizure of Venezuela’s leader, and trade wars.
“If there’s an overall message, it’s that China will be a reliable partner and that Chinese growth benefits the world,” said Henrietta Levin, senior fellow for the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies. “We’ll see a very heavy focus on Chinese leadership of the Global South.”
China’s relationship with Kyrgyzstan — involving trade, renewable energy investments, and construction of a railway linking the two countries — offers “some very concrete examples” of how Beijing seeks to work with partner nations, said Zichen Wang, deputy secretary general at the Center for China and Globalization, a think tank in Beijing.
“China wants its ideas on global governance to be persuasive internationally,” Wang added. “The SCO is one of the first places where people can look for evidence on how they work in practice.”
In other cases, Beijing seems intent on making inroads where Washington once held sway. Xi arrived in Egypt, one of the largest recipients of U.S. military aid, just as joint fighter jet exercises between China and Egypt concluded — a new practice begun only last year.
Xi’s trip to Cairo also came shortly after the Treasury Department imposed sanctions on a branch of a major Egyptian bank, part of a campaign of wide-ranging secondary sanctions against Iran.
The U.S. sanctions give Xi “a terrific opportunity, unusually well-timed, to stand alongside Egypt and cast that financial pressure as grounds for solidarity,” Gewirtz said.
One notable stop missing from Xi’s schedule, however, is the United Nations General Assembly in New York. The Chinese leader reportedly declined to attend the annual gathering of world leaders, even though he will already be in Washington at that time.
Xi’s decision to forgo the General Assembly and instead meet with Trump “suggests a preference for forums where Beijing is going to control more of this choreography,” Singleton said. “Xi wants diplomacy on terms where China can shape the agenda.”
A key part of his agenda: a pitch for China as a stable partner, especially for developing countries, during a period of what Beijing has portrayed as U.S.-driven geopolitical uncertainty.
The visits — to Kyrgyzstan, Egypt, India, and the United States — are a collective rarity for the Chinese leader, who has sharply limited his international travel since the coronavirus pandemic. Between 2021 and 2025, U.S. presidents logged 51 visits to other countries, compared to just 25 for Xi.
Other world leaders have been more than willing to visit Xi in China, allowing him the luxury of holding court at home. But experts say he now sees openings abroad.
“Xi sees an opportunity to show that China has friends and options around the world at exactly the time when Washington is pushing away and alienating many of its partners,” said Julian Gewirtz, who served as a China director on the National Security Council under the Biden administration.
The Chinese leader began with a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) — a 10-country economic and security bloc often described as a counterbalance to U.S. influence — in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, where he met Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, among others.
Xi on Wednesday wrapped a state visit in Cairo and is set to travel to New Delhi mid-month for a summit of the BRICS nations. In late September, the Chinese leader plans to visit Washington, where Trump is set to host him at the White House for a state dinner. The pair last met in Beijing in May.
The “selective” nature of the trips leading into Xi’s visit to Washington is no coincidence, said Craig Singleton, the senior director of the China Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington think tank.
The statecraft shows “Xi can stand beside Putin, he can court the Global South and still prepare for a summit with Trump,” Singleton said. “China wants Washington to see that it has diplomatic depth and strategic options.”
Beijing’s outreach comes as many developing countries are scrambling to react to a geopolitical or economic crisis, some precipitated by the Trump administration, including the war in Iran and Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the seizure of Venezuela’s leader, and trade wars.
“If there’s an overall message, it’s that China will be a reliable partner and that Chinese growth benefits the world,” said Henrietta Levin, senior fellow for the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies. “We’ll see a very heavy focus on Chinese leadership of the Global South.”
China’s relationship with Kyrgyzstan — involving trade, renewable energy investments, and construction of a railway linking the two countries — offers “some very concrete examples” of how Beijing seeks to work with partner nations, said Zichen Wang, deputy secretary general at the Center for China and Globalization, a think tank in Beijing.
“China wants its ideas on global governance to be persuasive internationally,” Wang added. “The SCO is one of the first places where people can look for evidence on how they work in practice.”
In other cases, Beijing seems intent on making inroads where Washington once held sway. Xi arrived in Egypt, one of the largest recipients of U.S. military aid, just as joint fighter jet exercises between China and Egypt concluded — a new practice begun only last year.
Xi’s trip to Cairo also came shortly after the Treasury Department imposed sanctions on a branch of a major Egyptian bank, part of a campaign of wide-ranging secondary sanctions against Iran.
The U.S. sanctions give Xi “a terrific opportunity, unusually well-timed, to stand alongside Egypt and cast that financial pressure as grounds for solidarity,” Gewirtz said.
One notable stop missing from Xi’s schedule, however, is the United Nations General Assembly in New York. The Chinese leader reportedly declined to attend the annual gathering of world leaders, even though he will already be in Washington at that time.
Xi’s decision to forgo the General Assembly and instead meet with Trump “suggests a preference for forums where Beijing is going to control more of this choreography,” Singleton said. “Xi wants diplomacy on terms where China can shape the agenda.”
Ken Paxton’s financial disclosures appear to violate federal ethics law, experts say.
By Troy Farah - Sep 5, 2026
Salon
pdf
Link to Internet (if no paywall or limited free access):
Summary
Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton, the Republican nominee for U.S. Senate, may have violated federal ethics law by failing to disclose income from rental properties and mortgages on condos. His financial disclosures also show a significant increase in net worth, raising questions about the transparency of his finances and potential conflicts of interest. Paxton’s opponent, Democratic state Rep. James Talarico, has criticized Paxton’s integrity and questioned the source of his wealth.
Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton’s financial disclosures raise concerns about potential conflicts of interest and lack of transparency. Paxton’s real estate investments, including properties in Florida, Texas, and Oklahoma, appear to be generating income despite his claims of no income. Additionally, Paxton’s significant increase in the valuation of certain properties, such as an Oklahoma lodge and a plot of land in Johnson County, without explanation, raises questions about the accuracy of his disclosures.
Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton’s financial disclosures raise concerns about potential conflicts of interest and lack of transparency. Paxton’s real estate investments, including properties in Florida, Texas, and Oklahoma, appear to be generating income despite his claims of no income. Additionally, Paxton’s significant increase in the valuation of certain properties, such as an Oklahoma lodge and a plot of land in Johnson County, without explanation, raises questions about the accuracy of his disclosures.
Key Points
- A joint review by ProPublica and The Texas Tribune reveals that Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton, currently the Republican nominee for U.S. Senate, appears to have violated federal ethics laws through significant errors and omissions in his financial disclosures. Ethics experts note that these discrepancies obscure his true net worth, asset values, and debt, hindering voters' ability to assess potential conflicts of interest as he competes in a close election against Democrat James Talarico.
- Paxton reported earning no income from seven homes he owns, despite public records and residents confirming that six of those properties are active rental units, a direct violation of disclosure requirements. Furthermore, he failed to list over $1.3 million in mortgages for three Utah resort condos—liabilities that federal law mandates reporting for non-primary residences. Paxton also previously lowballed the value of a vacant Texas land plot at under $50,000, despite his business partner confirming his stake has been worth roughly $1 million for years due to rezoning and market growth.
- These omissions align with a long-standing pattern of financial opacity throughout Paxton's three terms as attorney general, during which his net worth expanded from under $170,000 in 2001 to millions today on a modest government salary. While Paxton's campaign dismissed the findings as manufactured partisan controversy, ethics watchdogs warn that his fluctuating asset valuations—which swung his reported net worth from a negative range up to $27 million in a single year—severely erode public trust and highlights lax oversight by the Senate Ethics Committee.
Article's Full Text:
Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton appears to have violated federal ethics law in significant ways when filing recent disclosures of his assets and liabilities, creating confusion about his net worth and holdings, a review by ProPublica and The Texas Tribune found.
Among them: Paxton, the Republican nominee for U.S. Senate, reported owning seven homes but said he earned no income from any. Yet all but one was listed for rent during the reporting periods, and some current residents and neighbors at those addresses confirmed that the properties were rented, the news organizations found. Receiving income and not reporting it is a violation of federal disclosure law, three ethics experts said.
Additionally, Paxton did not disclose mortgages for three condos at a Utah golf resort that federal law requires him to list as liabilities if they are not personal residences.
He also valued his stake in a vacant plot of Texas land at up to $50,000 on last year’s filing, but his business partner told the newsrooms Paxton’s share for years has been worth about $1 million. Federal financial disclosure law requires property to be listed at fair market value.
The apparent errors and omissions the newsrooms found obscure the extent of Paxton’s income streams, assets, and debt, making it difficult for voters to make sense of his finances as they mull whether to support him in November’s election, the ethics experts said.
“It reflects either pure sloppiness on Paxton’s part or a deliberate effort to conceal some of his investments and property holdings,” said Craig Holman, a government affairs lobbyist for the nonpartisan good-government group Public Citizen.
If Paxton wins, an incomplete picture of his finances could prevent watchdogs from evaluating his conflicts of interest as a senator, Holman and others said.
The apparent omissions are part of a pattern for Paxton. Over three terms as attorney general, he has withheld financial information that could explain how he became a multimillionaire and had the resources to purchase more than a dozen properties in five states. He began including many of these on his state disclosures only after the Texas Ethics Commission closed a loophole in 2024 that Paxton had cited to leave them off. Most were acquired while Paxton earned a government salary of $153,750.
In the new federal disclosure, filed in August after Paxton received a three-month extension, he reported a net worth between $1 million and $27 million. That is a significantly higher range than the negative $1.9 million to $11.1 million net worth he reported a year ago, before he had secured the Republican nomination but after he had declared his candidacy for federal office.
The spike was driven not by Paxton’s acquisition of more assets but because the reported value on several of his properties soared.
Paxton’s report omitted listing as assets seven properties worth about $5.2 million collectively, including the Utah condos for which he did not disclose mortgages. He co-owns all of his known real estate holdings with his estranged wife, state Sen. Angela Paxton, property records show. The eight he reported are held by their blind trust, which is managed by a family friend.
Federal rules do not require candidates to report as assets personal homes or properties from which they don’t earn money, even if the properties are worth millions.
At a time when voters feel anxious about their own personal finances and dislike the idea of politicians getting rich in office, it would be wise for Paxton to be more transparent about his wealth, said Texas ethics and campaign finance lawyer Andrew Cates.
“If it were me trying to get people’s vote, I would err on the side of transparency rather than not,” Cates said.
Paxton declined to be interviewed and did not answer detailed questions about how he filled out the disclosure forms. Madison Cercy, a spokesperson for his campaign, said Paxton “has had a long and successful career outside of public service, including running his own small business as a lawyer. Stirring up partisan allegations is nothing more than a bad attempt to manufacture controversy where none exists.”
Before being elected to the state Legislature in 2002, Paxton worked at a law firm in the Dallas area and was a corporate attorney for JCPenney. His state financial disclosure for 2001 listed assets totaling no more than $170,000, a ProPublica and Tribune analysis found.
By 2015, his household net worth had grown to $5.4 million, according to financial records lawmakers subpoenaed in 2023 after impeaching Paxton on charges that he took bribes in exchange for helping an Austin real estate investor.
The records, few of which were admitted into evidence during the 10-day Senate trial that resulted in his acquittal, document how Paxton built a diverse portfolio that included investments in a cellphone tower, an HVAC company, a cement supplier, and a police body camera manufacturer. He netted $2.2 million when Motorola acquired the body camera firm in 2019, according to his income tax return from that year.
Shortly after, he went on a real estate buying spree, snapping up six properties in Oklahoma, Florida, Utah, and Hawaii. His impeachment defense team said Paxton made a prudent shift toward real estate at a time of rock-bottom interest rates.
Questions about Paxton’s integrity have dogged him in the race for U.S. Senate. His opponent, Democratic state Rep. James Talarico, entered September with a narrow polling lead — uncharted territory in a state where Republicans have not lost a statewide race in 32 years.
A University of Texas/Texas Politics Project poll released last week found that just a third of respondents viewed Paxton as “honest and trustworthy.” The same day the statewide poll was published, a super PAC supporting Talarico hit the airwaves with an ad that labeled the attorney general as “the most corrupt politician in Texas.” The commercial included a reference to Paxton’s recently disclosed net worth.
Talarico’s net worth, according to his most recent personal financial disclosure, was between $67,000 and $305,000. The range changed little from the previous year. Like Paxton, Talarico did not include his single personal residence among his reported assets.
James Henson, director of the Texas Politics Project, said the questions surrounding Paxton’s latest financial disclosures reinforce a longstanding narrative that the attorney general is secretive about his finances and may have leveraged his public position for personal gain.
“It’s his choice how much he explains or doesn’t explain,” Henson said. “But I think that comes with a potential cost, and we’re seeing that in public opinion.”
Paxton’s pivot to real estate appears to be a way to supplement his salary as attorney general. The newsrooms found recent rental listings for six of the properties he disclosed but for which he said he derived no income: two homes in Ocala, Florida; a home and a condo in Austin; a home in College Station, Texas; and a vacation lodge in Broken Bow, Oklahoma.
A tenant confirmed to the newsrooms she’s living at one of the Florida houses. At the Austin condo complex, a next-door neighbor said Paxton’s unit has a renter. And the five-bedroom, three-story Oklahoma lodge he owns is listed online as a short-term rental for up to $1,200 a night, with fall bookings filling up fast.
On his disclosure forms, which require real estate income to be reported, Paxton for each property selected the option “None (or less than $201).”
Federal law requires candidates who aren’t currently in Congress to report all loans exceeding $10,000, except those for personal residences. Paxton did not report three mortgages totaling $1.3 million for condos at the Black Desert Resort in southwest Utah, renowned for its world-class golf course. He purchased the properties in February; the reporting period for the most recent disclosure ran through mid-May.
Reporters found the mortgage documents in local land records. Each contains an addendum to the mortgage that is used for rental properties, said New Jersey real estate lawyer Daniel M. Shlufman. That addendum removes a requirement that the unit be owner-occupied and allows the lender to collect rent directly from tenants if Paxton were to default on the loan.
Paxton purchased another condo at the resort in 2025, which he disclosed on his most recent report as an asset and a liability. The land records show he obtained a $640,000 mortgage for it. The resort advertises a program in which it leases units purchased by investors, but it declined to say if Paxton’s properties were enrolled in it.
“It’s kind of mind-boggling to think about having four homes at one resort property and imagining those are for personal use,” said Cynthia Brown, a senior lawyer at the government watchdog Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington.
The most significant changes between Paxton’s 2025 and 2026 reports were the valuations of the Oklahoma lodge and a plot of land outside of Fort Worth, whose value he said had increased by millions of dollars.
He appears to have switched from reporting the properties’ assessed values, which are set by the local county, to the loftier estimates of what they would fetch on the open market.
Paxton’s initial use of the lowball values appears to defy federal rules aimed at bringing candidates’ disclosed property values in line with what they’re actually worth. While the Senate Ethics Committee instructs filers that they can use a recent tax assessment to set the worth of certain property, they must adjust it to market value if it is assessed below that. In these cases, valuations must be disclosed as a specific dollar figure rather than a range.
On both his annual reports as a Senate candidate, Paxton listed ranges for the value of each property he disclosed.
Last year, Paxton reported the Oklahoma lodge, just north of the Texas border, as worth between $100,001 and $250,000. The local county assesses the property at $176,000. Its estimated market value, meanwhile, is more than $1.5 million, according to real estate websites. This year, Paxton’s disclosure valued the property at between $1 million and $5 million.
Likewise, Paxton valued a 42-acre plot of undeveloped land in Johnson County, south of Fort Worth, at between $15,001 and $50,000 last year. The county assesses the property as farmland worth $20,008, but estimates its market value is $2.9 million. This year, Paxton’s disclosure said the property was worth between $1 million and $5 million.
Paxton bought the property in 2006 with a group of investors including Rob Orr, with whom he served in the Texas House of Representatives. Orr, who manages the investment, said in an interview that Paxton’s 20% stake is worth about $1 million.
“It would have been around a million for quite a while, probably the last four or five years,” Orr said. “It has increased in value because of zoning and because of time.”
The group bought the plot to hold onto, Orr said, until creeping growth from the Dallas-Fort Worth area made it attractive for redevelopment. He said the group is negotiating a sale to a developer. Last year, Orr persuaded the City Council in Burleson to rezone the land, which had been restricted to agriculture, to permit retail and housing.
Paxton’s move to significantly revalue his assets without explaining why is “very strange,” said Margaret Dylus-Yukins, senior counsel for ethics at the nonpartisan Campaign Legal Center, which advocates for strong disclosure rules. Dylus-Yukins, who worked for six years analyzing executive branch officials’ financial disclosures for the U.S. Office of Government Ethics, said the agency would ask filers to explain major changes in writing.
“When you have public officials that appear to be fudging the numbers on their disclosure forms, and the Senate Ethics Committee is letting that slide, then you’re not only eroding trust in the committee but the candidate himself,” Dylus-Yukins said, referring to the significant differences between the filings.
The ethics committee did not respond to requests for comment. Candidates or senators who willingly falsify financial disclosures can be fined up to $50,000 or prosecuted for making a false statement to the government, a felony. The committee rarely investigates senators and has not formally sanctioned a member in 19 years.
Candidates do not have to file any more federal financial disclosures before the November election.
Among them: Paxton, the Republican nominee for U.S. Senate, reported owning seven homes but said he earned no income from any. Yet all but one was listed for rent during the reporting periods, and some current residents and neighbors at those addresses confirmed that the properties were rented, the news organizations found. Receiving income and not reporting it is a violation of federal disclosure law, three ethics experts said.
Additionally, Paxton did not disclose mortgages for three condos at a Utah golf resort that federal law requires him to list as liabilities if they are not personal residences.
He also valued his stake in a vacant plot of Texas land at up to $50,000 on last year’s filing, but his business partner told the newsrooms Paxton’s share for years has been worth about $1 million. Federal financial disclosure law requires property to be listed at fair market value.
The apparent errors and omissions the newsrooms found obscure the extent of Paxton’s income streams, assets, and debt, making it difficult for voters to make sense of his finances as they mull whether to support him in November’s election, the ethics experts said.
“It reflects either pure sloppiness on Paxton’s part or a deliberate effort to conceal some of his investments and property holdings,” said Craig Holman, a government affairs lobbyist for the nonpartisan good-government group Public Citizen.
If Paxton wins, an incomplete picture of his finances could prevent watchdogs from evaluating his conflicts of interest as a senator, Holman and others said.
The apparent omissions are part of a pattern for Paxton. Over three terms as attorney general, he has withheld financial information that could explain how he became a multimillionaire and had the resources to purchase more than a dozen properties in five states. He began including many of these on his state disclosures only after the Texas Ethics Commission closed a loophole in 2024 that Paxton had cited to leave them off. Most were acquired while Paxton earned a government salary of $153,750.
In the new federal disclosure, filed in August after Paxton received a three-month extension, he reported a net worth between $1 million and $27 million. That is a significantly higher range than the negative $1.9 million to $11.1 million net worth he reported a year ago, before he had secured the Republican nomination but after he had declared his candidacy for federal office.
The spike was driven not by Paxton’s acquisition of more assets but because the reported value on several of his properties soared.
Paxton’s report omitted listing as assets seven properties worth about $5.2 million collectively, including the Utah condos for which he did not disclose mortgages. He co-owns all of his known real estate holdings with his estranged wife, state Sen. Angela Paxton, property records show. The eight he reported are held by their blind trust, which is managed by a family friend.
Federal rules do not require candidates to report as assets personal homes or properties from which they don’t earn money, even if the properties are worth millions.
At a time when voters feel anxious about their own personal finances and dislike the idea of politicians getting rich in office, it would be wise for Paxton to be more transparent about his wealth, said Texas ethics and campaign finance lawyer Andrew Cates.
“If it were me trying to get people’s vote, I would err on the side of transparency rather than not,” Cates said.
Paxton declined to be interviewed and did not answer detailed questions about how he filled out the disclosure forms. Madison Cercy, a spokesperson for his campaign, said Paxton “has had a long and successful career outside of public service, including running his own small business as a lawyer. Stirring up partisan allegations is nothing more than a bad attempt to manufacture controversy where none exists.”
Before being elected to the state Legislature in 2002, Paxton worked at a law firm in the Dallas area and was a corporate attorney for JCPenney. His state financial disclosure for 2001 listed assets totaling no more than $170,000, a ProPublica and Tribune analysis found.
By 2015, his household net worth had grown to $5.4 million, according to financial records lawmakers subpoenaed in 2023 after impeaching Paxton on charges that he took bribes in exchange for helping an Austin real estate investor.
The records, few of which were admitted into evidence during the 10-day Senate trial that resulted in his acquittal, document how Paxton built a diverse portfolio that included investments in a cellphone tower, an HVAC company, a cement supplier, and a police body camera manufacturer. He netted $2.2 million when Motorola acquired the body camera firm in 2019, according to his income tax return from that year.
Shortly after, he went on a real estate buying spree, snapping up six properties in Oklahoma, Florida, Utah, and Hawaii. His impeachment defense team said Paxton made a prudent shift toward real estate at a time of rock-bottom interest rates.
Questions about Paxton’s integrity have dogged him in the race for U.S. Senate. His opponent, Democratic state Rep. James Talarico, entered September with a narrow polling lead — uncharted territory in a state where Republicans have not lost a statewide race in 32 years.
A University of Texas/Texas Politics Project poll released last week found that just a third of respondents viewed Paxton as “honest and trustworthy.” The same day the statewide poll was published, a super PAC supporting Talarico hit the airwaves with an ad that labeled the attorney general as “the most corrupt politician in Texas.” The commercial included a reference to Paxton’s recently disclosed net worth.
Talarico’s net worth, according to his most recent personal financial disclosure, was between $67,000 and $305,000. The range changed little from the previous year. Like Paxton, Talarico did not include his single personal residence among his reported assets.
James Henson, director of the Texas Politics Project, said the questions surrounding Paxton’s latest financial disclosures reinforce a longstanding narrative that the attorney general is secretive about his finances and may have leveraged his public position for personal gain.
“It’s his choice how much he explains or doesn’t explain,” Henson said. “But I think that comes with a potential cost, and we’re seeing that in public opinion.”
Paxton’s pivot to real estate appears to be a way to supplement his salary as attorney general. The newsrooms found recent rental listings for six of the properties he disclosed but for which he said he derived no income: two homes in Ocala, Florida; a home and a condo in Austin; a home in College Station, Texas; and a vacation lodge in Broken Bow, Oklahoma.
A tenant confirmed to the newsrooms she’s living at one of the Florida houses. At the Austin condo complex, a next-door neighbor said Paxton’s unit has a renter. And the five-bedroom, three-story Oklahoma lodge he owns is listed online as a short-term rental for up to $1,200 a night, with fall bookings filling up fast.
On his disclosure forms, which require real estate income to be reported, Paxton for each property selected the option “None (or less than $201).”
Federal law requires candidates who aren’t currently in Congress to report all loans exceeding $10,000, except those for personal residences. Paxton did not report three mortgages totaling $1.3 million for condos at the Black Desert Resort in southwest Utah, renowned for its world-class golf course. He purchased the properties in February; the reporting period for the most recent disclosure ran through mid-May.
Reporters found the mortgage documents in local land records. Each contains an addendum to the mortgage that is used for rental properties, said New Jersey real estate lawyer Daniel M. Shlufman. That addendum removes a requirement that the unit be owner-occupied and allows the lender to collect rent directly from tenants if Paxton were to default on the loan.
Paxton purchased another condo at the resort in 2025, which he disclosed on his most recent report as an asset and a liability. The land records show he obtained a $640,000 mortgage for it. The resort advertises a program in which it leases units purchased by investors, but it declined to say if Paxton’s properties were enrolled in it.
“It’s kind of mind-boggling to think about having four homes at one resort property and imagining those are for personal use,” said Cynthia Brown, a senior lawyer at the government watchdog Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington.
The most significant changes between Paxton’s 2025 and 2026 reports were the valuations of the Oklahoma lodge and a plot of land outside of Fort Worth, whose value he said had increased by millions of dollars.
He appears to have switched from reporting the properties’ assessed values, which are set by the local county, to the loftier estimates of what they would fetch on the open market.
Paxton’s initial use of the lowball values appears to defy federal rules aimed at bringing candidates’ disclosed property values in line with what they’re actually worth. While the Senate Ethics Committee instructs filers that they can use a recent tax assessment to set the worth of certain property, they must adjust it to market value if it is assessed below that. In these cases, valuations must be disclosed as a specific dollar figure rather than a range.
On both his annual reports as a Senate candidate, Paxton listed ranges for the value of each property he disclosed.
Last year, Paxton reported the Oklahoma lodge, just north of the Texas border, as worth between $100,001 and $250,000. The local county assesses the property at $176,000. Its estimated market value, meanwhile, is more than $1.5 million, according to real estate websites. This year, Paxton’s disclosure valued the property at between $1 million and $5 million.
Likewise, Paxton valued a 42-acre plot of undeveloped land in Johnson County, south of Fort Worth, at between $15,001 and $50,000 last year. The county assesses the property as farmland worth $20,008, but estimates its market value is $2.9 million. This year, Paxton’s disclosure said the property was worth between $1 million and $5 million.
Paxton bought the property in 2006 with a group of investors including Rob Orr, with whom he served in the Texas House of Representatives. Orr, who manages the investment, said in an interview that Paxton’s 20% stake is worth about $1 million.
“It would have been around a million for quite a while, probably the last four or five years,” Orr said. “It has increased in value because of zoning and because of time.”
The group bought the plot to hold onto, Orr said, until creeping growth from the Dallas-Fort Worth area made it attractive for redevelopment. He said the group is negotiating a sale to a developer. Last year, Orr persuaded the City Council in Burleson to rezone the land, which had been restricted to agriculture, to permit retail and housing.
Paxton’s move to significantly revalue his assets without explaining why is “very strange,” said Margaret Dylus-Yukins, senior counsel for ethics at the nonpartisan Campaign Legal Center, which advocates for strong disclosure rules. Dylus-Yukins, who worked for six years analyzing executive branch officials’ financial disclosures for the U.S. Office of Government Ethics, said the agency would ask filers to explain major changes in writing.
“When you have public officials that appear to be fudging the numbers on their disclosure forms, and the Senate Ethics Committee is letting that slide, then you’re not only eroding trust in the committee but the candidate himself,” Dylus-Yukins said, referring to the significant differences between the filings.
The ethics committee did not respond to requests for comment. Candidates or senators who willingly falsify financial disclosures can be fined up to $50,000 or prosecuted for making a false statement to the government, a felony. The committee rarely investigates senators and has not formally sanctioned a member in 19 years.
Candidates do not have to file any more federal financial disclosures before the November election.
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